simple-snowflake-mcp@0.3.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Simple Snowflake MCP Server to work behind a corporate proxy" Observed in sandbox: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SNOWFLAKE_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: CONFIG_FILE, MCP_READ_ONLY, SNOWFLAKE_ACCOUNT, SNOWFLAKE_USER- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · reached only astral.sh
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names astral.sh as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SNOWFLAKE_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: calls astral.sh only, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 3 scenariosStatic findings
curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.if [ ! -f .env ]; thenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.echo "📝 Création du fichier .env..."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.chown -R mcp:mcp /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.cp .env.example .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.…out, connection reuse, rate limiting, notes bounds, and MCP capabilities. 2. **`.env`** — Snowflake credentials read **lazily** at connect time by `get_snowflake_co…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Load environment variables from the .env fileFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.monkeypatch.setenv("CONFIG_FILE", "../../../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.<summary>Development/Unpublished Servers Configuration</summary> ```json "mcpServers": { "simple_snowflake_mcp": { "command": "uv", "args": [ "--directory", "."Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.# Créer .env si nécessaireFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for simple-snowflake-mcp@0.3.0 as of 30 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim yann-barraud-yann: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.