Skills/PyPI/shuttle-mcp

shuttle-mcp@0.3.1

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Secure SSH gateway for AI assistants — MCP server with connection pooling, session isolation, and command safety" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher enwaiax · publishing for 241 daysInstalls 169Last detonated 57 min ago

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 28 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso reactjs.org, radix-ui.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx shuttle-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'shuttle'
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'typer'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'pydantic_settings'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'asyncssh'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'cryptography'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'asyncssh'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'sqlalchemy'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocess8 of 28 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.5sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/shuttle/db/seeds.py:48 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"pattern": r"chmod 777",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/shuttle/web/static/assets/index-pAwUhGZt.js:324 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges…),d.jsx("input",{required:!0,value:c,onChange:R=>f(R.target.value),placeholder:"sudo .*",className:Uu,style:{fontFamily:"var(--font-mono)"}})]}),d.jsxs("div",{childr…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/core/ssh_config.py:9 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"~/.ssh/id_ed25519",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandskills/shuttle.md:66 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesTo execute, re-run with: ssh_execute(command="sudo apt update", node="gpu-server", confirm_token="abc123")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/cli.py:564 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesNone, "--config", "-c", help="Path to SSH config file (default: ~/.ssh/config)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandskills/shuttle.md:63 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesCommand: sudo apt updateFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/core/ssh_config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Parse ~/.ssh/config into structured entries."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/shuttle/core/ssh_config.py:9 · References a credential file in the home directory"~/.ssh/id_ed25519",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/shuttle/db/seeds.py:91 · Remote installer piped to shell"pattern": r"curl .* \| bash",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/shuttle/cli.py:219 · References a credential file in the home directorykp = Prompt.ask(" [bold]Key file[/bold]", default="~/.ssh/id_rsa")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/cli.py:581 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconfig_display = config_path or "~/.ssh/config"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/shuttle/core/ssh_config.py:11 · References a credential file in the home directory"~/.ssh/id_ecdsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedsrc/shuttle/db/seeds.py:11 · Destructive file system command detected"pattern": r"^rm -rf /$",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/core/ssh_config.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"~/.ssh/id_rsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/cli.py:175 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesshuttle node add -n myserver -H 10.0.0.1 -u root -k ~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/shuttle/db/seeds.py:91 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code"pattern": r"curl .* \| bash",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/cli.py:219 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileskp = Prompt.ask(" [bold]Key file[/bold]", default="~/.ssh/id_rsa")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandskills/shuttle.md:53 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges| **confirm** | Returns a token, must re-call with `confirm_token` to execute | `sudo *`, `rm -rf`, `shutdown` |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/shuttle/core/ssh_config.py:10 · References a credential file in the home directory"~/.ssh/id_rsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedskills/shuttle.md:52 · Destructive file system command detected| **block** | Rejected, never executes | `rm -rf /`, `mkfs`, fork bomb |Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/cli.py:570 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Import SSH hosts from ~/.ssh/config as Shuttle nodes."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/shuttle/cli.py:175 · References a credential file in the home directoryshuttle node add -n myserver -H 10.0.0.1 -u root -k ~/.ssh/id_rsaFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/shuttle/core/ssh_config.py:11 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"~/.ssh/id_ecdsa",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/shuttle/db/seeds.py:36 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"pattern": r"sudo .*",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/shuttle/web/static/assets/index-pAwUhGZt.js:67 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…f=await c.text();throw new Error(`${c.status}: ${f}`)}if(c.status!==204)return c.json()}const Lt={stats:["stats"],nodes:r=>r?["nodes",r]:["nodes"],node:r=>["nodes",r],rules:["rules"],sessions:r=>r?["sessions",r]:["sessions"],logs:r=>["logs…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/shuttle/web/static/assets/index-pAwUhGZt.js:37 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…d 0,(e.current.flags&128)===128)}catch{}}var qt=Math.clz32?Math.clz32:Zm,Xm=Math.log,Jm=Math.LN2;function Zm(e){return e>>>=0,e===0?32:31-(Xm(e)/Jm|0)|0}var ca=64,da=4194304;function ao(e){switch(e&-e){case 1:return 1;case 2:return 2;case …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shuttle/db/seeds.py:66 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"pattern": r"kill -9",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/shuttle/db/seeds.py:68 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes"description": "Force kill process",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/shuttle/web/static/assets/index-pAwUhGZt.js:324 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…"a");F.href=R,F.download=`shuttle-export-${new Date().toISOString().slice(0,10)}.json`,document.body.appendChild(F),F.click(),F.remove(),URL.revokeObjectURL(R),p({type:"success",text:"Export downloaded successfully"})}catch(j){p({type:"err…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hidden zero-width characters detectedtests/README.md:276 · Hidden zero-width characters detected — may conceal content## 🏃‍♂️ Continuous IntegrationFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for shuttle-mcp@0.3.1 as of 38 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim enwaiax: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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