roundtable-mcp@0.2.1
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Self-hosted shared task board for AI agents — claim work, submit results over MCP. Private by design." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-14 and scored it 85/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(["bash", "-c", script], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Item 8 used to read /srv/roundtable/agents.json with sudo — a fileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert "sudo nginx -t && sudo systemctl reload nginx" in step30Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Transport: official ``mcp`` Python SDK v2 (``MCPServer``), Streamable HTTPFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "TOKEN=$(sudo python3" not in outsideFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.worker_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "sudo -u roundtable sqlite3 -readonly" in DEMOFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert GUIDE.count("sudo ss -tlnp") >= 3Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.WorkerConfig.from_env({**base, "ROUNDTABLE_URL": "http://192.168.1.1:8000/mcp"})Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "chmod 600" in INSTALLFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.blob = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.hashed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.worker_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.worker_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "sudo -u roundtable sqlite3 -readonly" in TEMPLATEFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.for entry in ("agents.json", ".env", ".venv", ".git", "roundtable.db"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert "chmod 600" in SCRIPT_TEXTFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert "sudo systemctl restart roundtable" in ADD_AGENTFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert "rm /srv/roundtable/agents.json.bak" in CONNECTFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for roundtable-mcp@0.2.1 as of 43 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.