roundtable-mcp@0.4.0
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Self-hosted shared task board for AI agents — claim work, submit results over MCP. Private by design." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.2.1
vet-skills diff roundtable-mcp 0.2.1 0.4.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.2.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
0.2.1 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
# Item 8 used to read /srv/roundtable/agents.json with sudo — a fileFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Transport: official ``mcp`` Python SDK v2 (``MCPServer``), Streamable HTTPFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.result = subprocess.run(["bash", "-c", script], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "sudo nginx -t && sudo systemctl reload nginx" in step30Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.blob = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.worker_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.WorkerConfig.from_env({**base, "ROUNDTABLE_URL": "http://192.168.1.1:8000/mcp"})Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.assert "sudo -u roundtable sqlite3 -readonly" in TEMPLATEFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.hashed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "TOKEN=$(sudo python3" not in outsideFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.for entry in ("agents.json", ".env", ".venv", ".git", "roundtable.db"):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "sudo -u roundtable sqlite3 -readonly" in DEMOFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert "chmod 600" in INSTALLFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "sudo systemctl restart roundtable" in ADD_AGENTFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert "chown appuser:appuser /data" in DOCKERFILEFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "chmod 600" in SCRIPT_TEXTFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.assert GUIDE.count("sudo ss -tlnp") >= 3Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assert "rm /srv/roundtable/agents.json.bak" in CONNECTFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.worker_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.proc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.worker_proc = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.