Skills/PyPI/repolore-mcp

repolore-mcp@0.5.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "RAG over your own engineering history on GitHub, with a CLI and an MCP server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ryckakas · publishing for 6 daysInstalls 456Last detonated 42 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx repolore-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/repolore/sources/local_docs.py:138 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellAGENTS.md:320 · Remote installer piped to shellto update an existing install, because every form of `uv tool install` drops an installed extra. Under `curl | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:371 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Any other client</b></summary> Most clients take a JSON entry in the portable `mcpServers` format: ```json { "mcpServers": { "repolore": { "command"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/repolore/processes.py:36 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.Popen(command, start_new_session=True, **options)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:206 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>Keeping it fresh</b></summary> `repolore refresh` ingests what changed and rebuilds the index with the settings it was built with, and only one refrFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/repolore/processes.py:9 · Python subprocess execution detected"subprocess.Popen(sys.argv[2:], creationflags=int(sys.argv[1]), "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/repolore/sources/github.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["gh", "auth", "token"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Pipe-to-shell patternAGENTS.md:320 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeto update an existing install, because every form of `uv tool install` drops an installed extra. Under `curl | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/repolore/clients.py:539 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/repolore/processes.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen([*intermediate, str(flags), *command], creationflags=flags, **options)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/repolore/processes.py:45 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# Out of the client's job object, whose closing would otherwise kill the process along with the server.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/repolore/processes.py:47 · Python subprocess execution detectedprocess = subprocess.Popen([*intermediate, str(flags), *command], creationflags=flags, **options)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:194 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>The shared server</b></summary> All sessions share one server that holds the model: each session's `repolore-mcp` is a small relay (about 70 MB) thaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈8,501 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ryckakas: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  5. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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