repolore-mcp@0.5.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "RAG over your own engineering history on GitHub, with a CLI and an MCP server." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 77/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.to update an existing install, because every form of `uv tool install` drops an installed extra. Under `curl | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary><b>Any other client</b></summary> Most clients take a JSON entry in the portable `mcpServers` format: ```json { "mcpServers": { "repolore": { "command"Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.subprocess.Popen(command, start_new_session=True, **options)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary><b>Keeping it fresh</b></summary> `repolore refresh` ingests what changed and rebuilds the index with the settings it was built with, and only one refrFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."subprocess.Popen(sys.argv[2:], creationflags=int(sys.argv[1]), "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(["gh", "auth", "token"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.to update an existing install, because every form of `uv tool install` drops an installed extra. Under `curl | sh`Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.process = subprocess.Popen([*intermediate, str(flags), *command], creationflags=flags, **options)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Out of the client's job object, whose closing would otherwise kill the process along with the server.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.process = subprocess.Popen([*intermediate, str(flags), *command], creationflags=flags, **options)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.<summary><b>The shared server</b></summary> All sessions share one server that holds the model: each session's `repolore-mcp` is a small relay (about 70 MB) thaFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
3 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ryckakas: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.