Skills/PyPI/renderdeck-mcp

renderdeck-mcp@0.9.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for generating PowerPoint presentations via Gemini" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher exjch · publishing for 238 daysInstalls 79Last detonated 42 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: RENDERDECK_REFERENCE_PATH
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx renderdeck-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/renderdeck_mcp/tools/generate_video.py:112 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_gemini_contents.py:11 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkDesign doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_gemini_references.py:10 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkDesign doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/renderdeck_mcp/tools/generate_video.py:59 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandtests/test_validate_tool.py:343 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions@pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform == "win32", reason="chmod not supported on Windows")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/renderdeck_mcp/cache/prompt_cache.py:7 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkDesign doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/prompt-file-cache/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrenderdeck.py:20 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env before any other optional deps that might use envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server_scaffold.py:57 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_cache_references.py:10 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkDesign doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_gemini_references.py:11 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkTest handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_cache_references.py:11 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkTest handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/renderdeck_mcp/tools/installer.py:33 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_generate_slide_refs.py:12 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkTest handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/renderdeck_mcp/tools/generate_video.py:47 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-version"], capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server_scaffold.py:97 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:69 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- NEVER commit `.env`, `.secrets/`, `credentials.json`, or `token.json`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Environment config from `.env` via python-dotenvFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/renderdeck_mcp/tools/generate_deck.py:6 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkDesign doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/generate-deck-tool/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_generate_slide_refs.py:11 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkDesign doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server_scaffold.py:79 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrenderdeck.py:5 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassembles a Google Slides presentation. Single file, config from .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/renderdeck_mcp/tools/generate_video.py:150 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrenderdeck.py:22 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_env_path = SCRIPT_DIR / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_gemini_contents.py:12 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkTest handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈1,117 tok
2 files · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim exjch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  4. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
  5. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim exjchPropose a patch to the maintainer