renderdeck-mcp@0.9.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for generating PowerPoint presentations via Gemini" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: RENDERDECK_REFERENCE_PATH- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso google.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names google.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects GOOGLE_GEMINI_API_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=120)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Design doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Design doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.@pytest.mark.skipif(sys.platform == "win32", reason="chmod not supported on Windows")Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Design doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/prompt-file-cache/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.# Load .env before any other optional deps that might use envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Design doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Test handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Test handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Test handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.subprocess.run(["ffmpeg", "-version"], capture_output=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.- NEVER commit `.env`, `.secrets/`, `credentials.json`, or `token.json`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Environment config from `.env` via python-dotenvFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Design doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/generate-deck-tool/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Design doc: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/design.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.assembles a Google Slides presentation. Single file, config from .env.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=180)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out._env_path = SCRIPT_DIR / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Test handoff: docs/sdd/epic-mcp-server-generation-assembly/reference-image-input/test-handoff.mdFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim exjch: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.