Skills/PyPI/remote-admin-mcp

remote-admin-mcp@0.2.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP Server for remote server administration via SSH — execute commands, manage files, edit configs, transfer files, control services. No agents needed on target servers." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher intershopper · publishing for 44 daysInstalls 84Last detonated 42 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx remote-admin-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Reads credential paths from the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_ssh_client.py:237 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceassert shlex.quote("foo;rm -rf /") in captured["cmd"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_ssh_client.py:237 · Destructive file system command detectedassert shlex.quote("foo;rm -rf /") in captured["cmd"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:78 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Full log: `cat ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:80 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Filter by date: `grep "2026-04-07" ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Reads credential paths from the home directoryAGENTS.md:78 · Reads credential paths from the home directory- Full log: `cat ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)run.sh:24 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkexec uv run ssh_mcp_server --transport http --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 "$@"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/ssh_mcp/ssh_client.py:58 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescmd = f"sudo bash -c {shlex.quote(f'timeout {timeout} bash -c {shlex.quote(command)}')}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrun.sh:11 · Remote installer piped to shellcurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_ssh_client.py:236 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceclient.search_in_file("t", "/f", "foo;rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_ssh_client.py:236 · Destructive file system command detectedclient.search_in_file("t", "/f", "foo;rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/ssh_mcp/server.py:288 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesaudit.log(srv, "transfer_file", f"upload {local_path} → {remote_path}", arguments.get("reason", ""))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesAll write operations are logged to `~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log` (configurable via `SSH_MCP_AUDIT_LOG` in `.env`).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrun.sh:11 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecurl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandAGENTS.md:36 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges4. **Use sudo when needed** — For service management and system filesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsAGENTS.md:79 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Filter by server: `grep "\[pi4\]" ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtests/test_ssh_client.py:105 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesassert captured["cmd"].startswith("sudo bash -c ")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtests/test_ssh_client.py:99 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescmd = f"sudo bash -c {shlex.quote(f'timeout {timeout} bash -c {shlex.quote(command)}')}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtests/test_ssh_client.py:72 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges# ----------------------------- Quoting / sudo -----------------------------Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Privileged sudo commandtests/test_ssh_client.py:81 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegescmd = f"sudo bash -c {shlex.quote(f'timeout {timeout} bash -c {shlex.quote(command)}')}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈822 tok
2 files · 21 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim intershopper: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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