remote-admin-mcp@0.2.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP Server for remote server administration via SSH — execute commands, manage files, edit configs, transfer files, control services. No agents needed on target servers." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso astral.sh — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Reads credential paths from the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
assert shlex.quote("foo;rm -rf /") in captured["cmd"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.assert shlex.quote("foo;rm -rf /") in captured["cmd"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Full log: `cat ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Filter by date: `grep "2026-04-07" ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.- Full log: `cat ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.exec uv run ssh_mcp_server --transport http --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8080 "$@"Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.cmd = f"sudo bash -c {shlex.quote(f'timeout {timeout} bash -c {shlex.quote(command)}')}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.client.search_in_file("t", "/f", "foo;rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.client.search_in_file("t", "/f", "foo;rm -rf /")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.audit.log(srv, "transfer_file", f"upload {local_path} → {remote_path}", arguments.get("reason", ""))Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.All write operations are logged to `~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log` (configurable via `SSH_MCP_AUDIT_LOG` in `.env`).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | shFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.4. **Use sudo when needed** — For service management and system filesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.- Filter by server: `grep "\[pi4\]" ~/.ssh-mcp-audit.log`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.assert captured["cmd"].startswith("sudo bash -c ")Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.cmd = f"sudo bash -c {shlex.quote(f'timeout {timeout} bash -c {shlex.quote(command)}')}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.# ----------------------------- Quoting / sudo -----------------------------Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.cmd = f"sudo bash -c {shlex.quote(f'timeout {timeout} bash -c {shlex.quote(command)}')}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim intershopper: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.