Skills/PyPI/regent-mcp

regent-mcp@1.0.0

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "An MCP server that lets an AI configure an OpenWrt router in plain language and roll back changes that break the connection" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher m-o-z-z-i-x · publishing for 110 daysInstalls 71Last detonated 1 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx regent-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.2sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.2sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_shell.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"lan > /etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_apply.py:30 · Destructive file system command detected"uci set a.b.c=1 && rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:70 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env.example ships only in the sdist, so the message has to carry the settings itselfFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:10 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# these cover validation and defaults, so a developer's own .env must not change the resultFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_backup.py:139 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("hostile", ["/tmp/x; reboot", "/tmp/$(reboot)", "../etc/passwd"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:59 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesinclude = ["regent", "tests", "README.md", "LICENSE", "pytest.ini", ".env.example"]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_diagnostics.py:46 · Destructive file system command detected"a && rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_diagnostics.py:46 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"a && rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_destructive.py:64 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files@pytest.mark.parametrize("hostile", ["/tmp/x.bin; reboot", "/tmp/$(reboot)", "../etc/passwd"])Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_security.py:14 · Destructive file system command detectedINJECTIONS = ["; reboot", " && rm -rf /", "$(reboot)", "`reboot`", " | sh"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_adblock.py:364 · Destructive file system command detectedassert "rm -f /tmp/adb_runtime.json" in session.commandsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_apply.py:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"uci set a.b.c=1 > /etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsregent/config.py:62 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# .env.example ships only in the sdist, so spell the settings out instead of naming itFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandregent/rollback.py:35 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesreturn f"kill $(cat {PID_FILE}) 2>/dev/null; rm -f {PID_FILE}; rm -rf {BACKUP_DIR}"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_security.py:14 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or deviceINJECTIONS = ["; reboot", " && rm -rf /", "$(reboot)", "`reboot`", " | sh"]Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_shell.py:11 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"lan && rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_apply.py:31 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"uci set a.b.c=1 | tee /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsregent/paths.py:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# DESCRIPTION: where the key, the log and .env live, checked out or installedFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_shell.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"lan | tee /etc/passwd",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:16 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file> **Disclaimer:** This project is provided under the **MIT License** and hands an AI **root access to a live router**.Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Destructive file system command detectedtests/test_shell.py:11 · Destructive file system command detected"lan && rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsregent/paths.py:44 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn [path.abspath(".env"), path.join(configDir(), ".env")]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:51 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# renaming the project must not invalidate a .env somebody already wroteFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesassert active == [], f"OPENWRT_KEY is set in .env.example: {active}"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_diagnostics.py:47 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"a|cat /etc/shadow",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Destructive command against a filesystem root or devicetests/test_apply.py:30 · Destructive command against a filesystem root or device"uci set a.b.c=1 && rm -rf /",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_config.py:61 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesexample = pathlib.Path(".env.example").read_text(encoding = "utf-8")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsregent/config.py:2 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# DESCRIPTION: runtime settings loaded from the environment and .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈66 tok
1 file · 63 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim m-o-z-z-i-x: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Destructive command against a filesystem root or device≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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