edubase@2.0.12

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Configure the connection to EduBase" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry Docker MCP CatalogPublisher edubase · publishing for 248 daysInstalls 62,582Last detonated 55 min ago
$docker run -i --rm mcp/edubase
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
APP_SECRETEDUBASE_API_KEYEDUBASE_OAUTHEDUBASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVEREDUBASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URLConfiguration, not credentials: EDUBASE_ALLOW_PRIVATE_NETWORK, EDUBASE_API_APP, EDUBASE_API_MAXRATE, EDUBASE_API_MAXRATE60, EDUBASE_API_URL, EDUBASE_CONFIG_PROVIDERS, EDUBASE_CONTENT_RESOURCES, EDUBASE_DEVELOPER_DOCS, EDUBASE_DYNAMIC_TOOLSETS, EDUBASE_ELICITATION, EDUBASE_FILEBIN_ALLOWED_HOSTS, EDUBASE_HTTP_PORT, EDUBASE_OUTPUT_SCHEMAS, EDUBASE_READONLY, EDUBASE_SSE_MODE, EDUBASE_STATIC_URL, EDUBASE_STREAMABLE_HTTP_MODE, EDUBASE_TOOLSETS, EDUBASE_URL
Where it talks to
edubase.net (its own)Also katex.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names katex.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects APP_SECRET, EDUBASE_API_KEY, EDUBASE_OAUTH, EDUBASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER, EDUBASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URL only into requests to edubase.net (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets APP_SECRET=edubase.net,EDUBASE_API_KEY=edubase.net,EDUBASE_OAUTH=edubase.net,EDUBASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_SERVER=edubase.net,EDUBASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URL=edubase.net -- docker run -i --rm mcp/edubase

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
6.1sprocessdependency install exit 0
26sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · (node:1448) [UNDICI-EHPA] Warning: EnvHttpProxyAgent is experimental, expect them to change at any time. (Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created) Error: EDUBASE_API_APP environment variable is required with this transport mode
26sprocessscript backend runs setup only
26sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:22 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && shx chmod +x dist/*.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/server.test.mjs:96 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`tools/list with output schemas: ${size} characters`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiontest/server.test.mjs:85 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(`tools/list without output schemas: ${size} characters`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/server.test.mjs:413 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst child = spawn(process.execPath, [SERVER], { env: { PATH: process.env.PATH, EDUBASE_STREAMABLE_HTTP_MODE: 'true', EDUBASE_HTTP_PORT: String(port), ...env }, stdio: 'ignore' });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstest/server.test.mjs:30 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv: { PATH: process.env.PATH, EDUBASE_API_URL: 'http://127.0.0.1:9/api', EDUBASE_API_APP: 'app', EDUBASE_API_KEY: 'secret', ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈31 tok
1 file · 73 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Vulnerability advisories (OSV) cover npm and PyPI packages; this registry has no advisory database.