proliant-mcp@0.8.0
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "MCP server for HPE compute: read-only tools for ProLiant iLO (Redfish), HPE Compute Ops Management (GreenLake) and HPE OneView / Synergy" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
HPECOM_CLIENT_SECRETILO_PASSWORDONEVIEW_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: HPECOM_CLIENT_ID, HPECOM_REGION, ILO_HOST, ILO_NAME, ILO_USERNAME, ILO_VERIFY_SSL, ONEVIEW_HOST, ONEVIEW_NAME, ONEVIEW_USERNAME, ONEVIEW_VERIFY_SSL, PROLIANT_MCP_CONFIG, USERNAME- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso hpe.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names hpe.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects HPECOM_CLIENT_SECRET, ILO_PASSWORD, ONEVIEW_PASSWORD only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.6.2
vet-skills diff proliant-mcp 0.6.2 0.8.0In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.6.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
0.6.2 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: README links to an external installer; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials; Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
https://github.com/hjma29/proliant-mcp/archive/refs/heads/main.zipFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return self._send(200, _password_form(prompt, "Enter your password."))Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.message=f"Type the password shared by the {len(missing)} entries that have none.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.title: str = "Enter your password"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim hjma29: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- README links to an external installer≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.