Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 74 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 3 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/src/proliant_mcp/chat.py b/src/proliant_mcp/chat.py
--- a/src/proliant_mcp/chat.py
+++ b/src/proliant_mcp/chat.py
@@ -65,1 +65,0 @@
-title: str = "Enter your password"
@@ -148,1 +147,0 @@
-return self._send(200, _password_form(prompt, "Enter your password."))
diff --git a/src/proliant_mcp/chat_inventory.py b/src/proliant_mcp/chat_inventory.py
--- a/src/proliant_mcp/chat_inventory.py
+++ b/src/proliant_mcp/chat_inventory.py
@@ -166,1 +166,0 @@
-message=f"Type the password shared by the {len(missing)} entries that have none.",
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.8.0. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: proliant-mcp: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 74)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.9.2) and scored it **CAUTION 74/100**. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/proliant-mcp/0.8.0 ## Findings with a location - `src/proliant_mcp/chat.py:148` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — src/proliant_mcp/chat.py:148 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering - `src/proliant_mcp/chat_inventory.py:166` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — src/proliant_mcp/chat_inventory.py:166 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering - `src/proliant_mcp/chat.py:65` · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — src/proliant_mcp/chat.py:65 · Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials — social engineering ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 3 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork hjma29/proliant-mcp --clone && cd proliant-mcp curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/proliant-mcp/0.8.0/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/0.8.0 && git commit -am "proliant-mcp: Prompting user to enter sensitive credentials" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/proliant-mcp/0.8.0/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.