Skills/PyPI/omni-app-mcp

omni-app-mcp@0.2.2

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Omni REST API (stdio)." Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher trustxai · publishing for 209 daysInstalls 66Last detonated 22 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
omniapp.co (its own)Also exploreomni.dev — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/omni_mcp/tools/model_git.py:114 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking`https://x-access-token:<PAT>@github.com/org/repo.git` is a valid clone URL,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:20 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions&& chown -R appuser:appuser /appFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathspyproject.toml:75 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"live: integration tests against a real Omni instance (requires .env credentials)",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omni_mcp/config.py:28 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesmodel_config = SettingsConfigDict(env_file=".env", env_file_encoding="utf-8", extra="ignore")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omni_mcp/tools/health.py:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesThe environment wins; a value that came from a `.env` file is recovered fromFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omni_mcp/tools/health.py:161 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Fix the variable in the environment or `.env`, then restart the server.",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omni_mcp/config.py:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Settings for the Omni MCP server, loaded from env vars / .env."""Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:16 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load .env so live-marked tests can pick up real credentials; non-live testsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omni_mcp/tools/health.py:133 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesthe validation error (a `.env`-only value on a field that validated) isFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:54 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesskip_live = pytest.mark.skip(reason="live tests require OMNI_API_KEY in the environment / .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omni_mcp/client.py:113 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"No Omni API key configured. Set OMNI_API_KEY in the environment or .env "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/omni_mcp/client.py:108 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"No Omni instance URL configured. Set OMNI_BASE_URL in the environment or .env "Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionsrc/omni_mcp/tools/uploads.py:75 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filestype: UploadType = Field(default=UploadType.CSV, description="Filter by upload type.")Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:67 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"""Keep the developer's real OMNI_* env / .env out of non-live tests.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_tool_modules.py:54 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_health.py:221 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Never claimed as missing: the key may well be configured in `.env`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_model_git.py:532 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingsecret_url = "https://x-access-token:[email protected]/org/repo.git"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_health.py:126 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileserror = RuntimeError("No Omni API key configured. Set OMNI_API_KEY in the environment or .env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:76 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system fileschdirs away from the repo (so `Settings(env_file=".env")` finds nothing),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_live_read.py:4 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenvironment or `.env`; run with `uv run pytest -m live`.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_health.py:207 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesA key that only exists in `.env` cannot be recovered from the validationFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_tool_modules.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`.env`, the same isolation `tests/conftest.py` gives in-process tests.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_server.py:94 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_tool_modules.py:268 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈47 tok
1 file · 80 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for omni-app-mcp@0.2.2 as of 21 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim trustxai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. URL with embedded credentials≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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