Propose a patch
A fix the maintainer can act on, with the evidence attached. It opens under your GitHub account in your browser; KillerSkills holds no token and never modifies the package. The fix is verified the only way we verify anything: the next crawl re-runs the new version in the honeypot. 56 · Caution
Evidence
The sandbox observed nothing beyond the static findings; the proposal cites those.
Diff · removes 2 caught lines
Download .patchdiff --git a/src/omni_mcp/tools/model_git.py b/src/omni_mcp/tools/model_git.py --- a/src/omni_mcp/tools/model_git.py +++ b/src/omni_mcp/tools/model_git.py @@ -114,1 +114,0 @@ -`https://x-access-token:<PAT>@github.com/org/repo.git` is a valid clone URL, diff --git a/tests/test_model_git.py b/tests/test_model_git.py --- a/tests/test_model_git.py +++ b/tests/test_model_git.py @@ -532,1 +532,0 @@ -secret_url = "https://x-access-token:[email protected]/org/repo.git"
Zero-context hunks: apply with git apply --unidiff-zero fix.patch on the tagged source of 0.2.2. If the behavior is intended, declare it (host under permissions.network, a line in the README) instead of removing it; the next crawl scores declarations.
Issue / PR body
Title: omni-app-mcp: URL with embedded credentials (KillerSkills verdict caution 56)
## What the honeypot observed KillerSkills ran **[email protected]** in an isolated sandbox (decoy credentials, recording proxy, syscall trace; engine 1.8.1) and scored it **CAUTION 56/100**. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed. - See the findings below. Full trace and findings: https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/omni-app-mcp/0.2.2 ## Findings with a location - `src/omni_mcp/tools/model_git.py:114` · URL with embedded credentials — src/omni_mcp/tools/model_git.py:114 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking - `tests/test_model_git.py:532` · URL with embedded credentials — tests/test_model_git.py:532 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking ## Proposed change The attached patch removes the 2 lines above. If the behavior is intended, the fix is to declare it instead: list the host under `permissions.network` (or the MCP manifest) and say in the README why the package needs it; the next crawl will re-score it with the declaration taken into account. ## How this will be verified Nothing is "verified safe" by assertion. When a new version is published, KillerSkills re-runs it in the honeypot and the verdict page updates; you can trigger it early from the verdict page ("Re-scan after I publish a fix"). Reply here or at [email protected] if you believe the verdict is wrong; disputes are reviewed by a person and the outcome is published on the verdict page. _Proposed through killerskills.ai/threats by a user of the package, under their own GitHub account. The evidence is public; the package was never modified by KillerSkills._
# or from a terminal, under your own account: gh repo fork trustxai/omni-mcp --clone && cd omni-mcp curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/omni-app-mcp/0.2.2/patch.diff | git apply --unidiff-zero git checkout -b killerskills/0.2.2 && git commit -am "omni-app-mcp: URL with embedded credentials" gh pr create --fill --body-file <(curl -s https://killerskills.ai/skills/pypi/omni-app-mcp/0.2.2/patch.md)
We count proposals opened, not merged: a merge shows up as a new version that the crawl re-runs. Disputes: the maintainer can contest the verdict from its page; a person reviews it and the outcome is published.