Skills/PyPI/netexec-mcp

netexec-mcp@1.0.10

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server that drives NetExec (nxc) for authorized security testing." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher mpgn · publishing for 104 daysInstalls 840Last detonated 35 h ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it under the guard. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx netexec-mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Credential pass-through configuration; Credential pass-through configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/smb.py:1224 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegespath). Applying it (review first!) typically: `sudo sh -c 'cat <file> >> /etc/hosts'`.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ldap.py:181 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsReports OS/domain and the auth result (`[+]`/`[-]`). Pass credentials to bind,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/rdp.py:122 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsthe auth result (`[+]`, with `Pwn3d!` when the account can log in). Pass credentialsFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/smb.py:1249 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesf"sudo sh -c 'cat {output_file} >> /etc/hosts'"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:13 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges(runs sudo and copies ``/etc/shadow`` to verify the user can reach root).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/smb.py:1237 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesf"sudo sh -c 'cat {output_file} >> /etc/hosts'"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:198 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"""Actively verify the user can escalate to root via sudo (`--sudo-check`).Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/mssql.py:146 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsrole). Pass credentials to authenticate, or none to fingerprint the service.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:9 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesdoes a *non-intrusive* privilege check (``id; sudo -ln``), reportingFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:90 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesnon-intrusive `id; sudo -ln` check). Authenticate with `username`+`password`, or aFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/netexec_mcp/dynamic.py:248 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# and the alphabet chose the one that kills. Plural only: "kill a process" stays on taskkill,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:205 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`/etc/shadow` on the target.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedsrc/netexec_mcp/executor.py:160 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/nfs.py:12 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsupload (chmod 777) and ``chmod`` of remote files.Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:13 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(runs sudo and copies ``/etc/shadow`` to verify the user can reach root).Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/winrm.py:104 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsopen a remote shell). Pass credentials to authenticate, or none to probe whetherFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:200 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesUnlike the passive check in `ssh_enum_hosts`, this *runs* sudo and copiesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/netexec_mcp/executor.py:213 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes2. The kill therefore targets the group, not the process.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/netexec_mcp/modules/ssh.py:201 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`/etc/shadow` to a temp file to confirm root access. `method` is "sudo-stdin"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/nfs.py:175 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsshare (written with chmod 777). `share` selects the export. OFFENSIVE-GATEDFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/nfs.py:194 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"""Change permissions of a remote NFS file (`--chmod <perms> <file>`).Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/netexec_mcp/dynamic.py:1188 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesexcept Exception as exc: # noqa: BLE001 -- never let a dispatch failure kill the turnFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationsrc/netexec_mcp/modules/wmi.py:116 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentialsaccount is a local admin). Pass credentials to authenticate, or none to fingerprintFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/netexec_mcp/dynamic.py:249 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# and "kill" points there so "kill processes" does too.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/netexec_mcp/executor.py:216 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processeswould kill them at the instant of expiry and every byte still in the pipe would beFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈54 tok
1 file · 31 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for netexec-mcp@1.0.10 as of 32 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim mpgn: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  3. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
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