mcp-vulnerabilities@1.7.32
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Open-Source OSV-Compliant Model Context Protocol (MCP) Vulnerability Advisory Database" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URLGH_TOKENGITHUB_TOKENGLAMA_API_KEYNVD_API_KEYSLACK_WEBHOOK_URLor--no-authConfiguration, not credentials: MCP_CACHE_DIR, MCP_VULN_CACHE_DIR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com, osv.dev, nist.gov, jsdelivr.net, shields.io, apple.com, glama.ai, jsonfeed.org, cve.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names githubusercontent.com, osv.dev, nist.gov, jsdelivr.net, shields.io, apple.com, glama.ai, jsonfeed.org, cve.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects DISCORD_WEBHOOK_URL, GH_TOKEN, GITHUB_TOKEN, GLAMA_API_KEY, NVD_API_KEY, SLACK_WEBHOOK_URL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.7.17
vet-skills diff mcp-vulnerabilities 1.7.17 1.7.32In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.7.17 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
1.7.17 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 79/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Collects environment variables by secret-like names; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
p = subprocess.Popen(['xclip', '-selection', 'clipboard'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.Popen(['pbcopy'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.p = subprocess.Popen(['clip'], stdin=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.for k, v in os.environ.items():Fix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.IGNORE_DIRS = {".git", "node_modules", ".venv", "venv", "env", ".env", "dist", "build"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.self.process = subprocess.Popen(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_dir), "sparse-checkout", "add", eco], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."--catalog-file", default="data/mcp_servers.json", help="Output catalog path"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."""Discovers globally installed npm and npx cached MCP servers."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_dir), "pull", "--rebase"], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=self.repo_root, capture_output=True, check=check)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.aud_p.add_argument("--global", dest="audit_global", action="store_true", help="Audit globally installed npm/npx MCP packages")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."--output-gz", default="vulnerabilities.json.gz", help="Output gzip file path"Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.result = subprocess.run(run_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["notify-send", title, message, f"--urgency={urgency}"], check=False, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(exec_cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=self.timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."""Discovers and parses MCP configurations across 17 AI clients + global npm/npx packages."""Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "-C", str(repo_dir), "reset", "--hard", "origin/main"], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True, timeout=self.timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run([self.engine_cmd, "rm", "-f", container_id], capture_output=True, check=False)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.result = subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(["git", "clone", "--filter=blob:none", "--sparse", self.repo_url, str(repo_dir)], check=True, capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.subprocess.run(launch_cmd, check=True, capture_output=True, timeout=timeout)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
1 point to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim pypi: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Collects environment variables by secret-like names≈ +4 on the totalNever read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.