Skills/PyPI/mcp-server-malcolm

mcp-server-malcolm@1.2.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP server for the Malcolm network traffic analysis platform (Zeek + Suricata + Arkime + OpenSearch + NetBox) — full read surface plus opt-in, audited write tools" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher nagametw · publishing for 106 daysInstalls 447Last detonated 5d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MALCOLM_PASSWORDConfiguration, not credentials: MALCOLM_BASE_URL, MALCOLM_MCP_AUDIT_FILE, MALCOLM_MCP_UPLOAD_DIR, MALCOLM_SSL_VERIFY, MALCOLM_TIMEOUT, MALCOLM_URL, MALCOLM_USERNAME
Where it talks to
malcolm.example (its own)
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for MALCOLM_PASSWORD and talks to malcolm.example. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.

$vet-skills run --secrets MALCOLM_PASSWORD=malcolm.example -- uvx mcp-server-malcolm

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: URL with embedded credentials; URL with embedded credentials; References a credential file in the home directory. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_arkime_content.py:367 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files{"session_id": _SID, "file_hash": "../../etc/passwd"},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_arkime_new_tools.py:84 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesraised = await raised_by(mcp, "arkime_file_by_hash", {"file_hash": "../etc/passwd"})Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_client_guards.py:22 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking_BASE = "https://operator1:[email protected]"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/mcp_server_malcolm/errors.py:99 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingStrips URL userinfo (``https://user:pw@host`` -> ``https://host``) and theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialssrc/mcp_server_malcolm/errors.py:104 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking>>> redact("GET https://operator1:[email protected]/mapi/fields failed")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Hex-encoded string detectedtests/test_read_fixes.py:39 · Hex-encoded string detected — may contain obfuscated payloadsreturn httpx.Response(200, content=b"\xd4\xc3\xb2\xa1\x02\x00\x04\x00rest-of-pcap")Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_client_guards.py:273 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesawait c.extracted_file("a/../../etc/passwd")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
References a credential file in the home directorysrc/mcp_server_malcolm/tools/write/pcap_upload.py:12 · References a credential file in the home directorycould exfiltrate any file the process can read (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/...). IfFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/mcp_server_malcolm/tools/write/pcap_upload.py:12 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescould exfiltrate any file the process can read (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/...). IfFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)tests/test_dsl_tools.py:56 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkdef _dsl_server(handler) -> tuple[MCPServer, list[httpx.Request]]:Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_arkime_content.py:242 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files_server(handler), "arkime_session_payload", {"session_id": "../../etc/passwd"}Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Reads credential paths from the home directorysrc/mcp_server_malcolm/tools/write/pcap_upload.py:12 · Reads credential paths from the home directorycould exfiltrate any file the process can read (~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.aws/...). IfFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST03
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_errors.py:40 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking"GET https://operator1:[email protected]/mapi/fields -> 401",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)src/mcp_server_malcolm/server.py:155 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over networkf"[mcp-server-malcolm] write classes: {cfg.enabled_summary()}", file=sys.stderr, flush=TrueFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_errors.py:44 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking("https://admin:p%[email protected]/x", "p%40ss", "192.0.2.1"),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_client_guards.py:271 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# decoded view and reads as "/extracted-files/a/../../etc/passwd" evenFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈80 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-server-malcolm@1.2.1 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Reads credential paths from the home directory≈ +9 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim nagametw: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. References a credential file in the home directory≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. URL with embedded credentials≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Hex-encoded string detected≈ +2 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
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