Skills/PyPI/mcp-client-jupyter-chat

mcp-client-jupyter-chat@0.1.7

CAUTION· static only

Publisher claims: "A JupyterLab extension for Chat with AI supporting MCP" Observed in sandbox: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher ihrpr · publishing for 659 daysInstalls 14Last detonated 8d ago

Coverage

Static only; nothing was run yet.

The label rests on the code, the instruction files and the publisher. The honeypot run replaces this verdict when it completes.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
nothing has run yet
What we could not test
everything: the server has not run yet

Run it before you trust it. Nothing has run yet: the code was read, the server was not. `vet-skills try` runs this exact version in the honeypot in about a minute.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills analysed it statically (a sandbox run is pending) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 56/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Base64 encoding combined with network call. Summary: static analysis only — behavior not yet observed.

Behavior trace

Queued for honeypot run · static analysis only
t+CategoryObserved action

This version has not been detonated yet. The score above counts behavior as unknown (50/100), so it cannot read Verified until the honeypot run completes and replaces this verdict.

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_client_jupyter_chat/labextension/static/414.88dd1f734f3007e572a6.js:1 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"use strict";(self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat=self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat||[]).push([[414],{115:(e,n,t)=>{t.r(n),t.d(n,{default:()=>q});var o=t(72),r=t.n(o),a=t(825),s=t.n(a),i=tFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_client_jupyter_chat/labextension/static/642.146a8d9809eeb5254761.js:1 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat=self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat||[]).push([[642],{642:(e,t,s)=>{"use strict";s.r(t),s.d(t,{AI_PROMPT:()=>Dt,APIConnectionError:()=>k,APIConnectionTimFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)mcp_client_jupyter_chat/labextension/static/414.88dd1f734f3007e572a6.js:1 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network"use strict";(self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat=self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat||[]).push([[414],{115:(e,n,t)=>{t.r(n),t.d(n,{default:()=>q});var o=t(72),r=t.n(o),a=t(825),s=t.n(a),i=tFix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionmcp_client_jupyter_chat/labextension/static/642.146a8d9809eeb5254761.js:1 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files(self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat=self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat||[]).push([[642],{642:(e,t,s)=>{"use strict";s.r(t),s.d(t,{AI_PROMPT:()=>Dt,APIConnectionError:()=>k,APIConnectionTimFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Base64 encoding combined with network callmcp_client_jupyter_chat/labextension/static/526.2a05c8e4512b459bf61c.js:1 · Base64 encoding combined with network call — potential data exfiltration"use strict";(self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat=self.webpackChunkmcp_client_jupyter_chat||[]).push([[526],{88:(e,t,s)=>{s.d(t,{K:()=>a});var r=s(950);class n{constructor(e){this._options=e,thisFix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 58 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-client-jupyter-chat@0.1.7 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

24 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim ihrpr: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Obfuscated code≈ +5 on the totalRemove base64-assembled strings, eval of decoded text and minified blobs. Reviewers and scanners both treat unreadable code as hostile.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Base64 encoding combined with network call≈ +4 on the totalPut hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)≈ +2 on the totalNamespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim ihrprPropose a patch to the maintainer