Skills/PyPI/mcp-authscan

mcp-authscan@1.1.37

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "MCP AuthScan" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher lhmisme420 · publishing for 49 daysInstalls 4,956Last detonated 27 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-authscan -- uvx mcp-authscan
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 60 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
MCP_AUTHSCAN_SIGNING_KEYMCPAUTHSCAN_CLIENT_IDMCPAUTHSCAN_CLIENT_SECRETMCPAUTHSCAN_CROSS_TENANTMCPAUTHSCAN_FOREIGN_IDMCPAUTHSCAN_RATEMCPAUTHSCAN_REDIRECT_URIMCPAUTHSCAN_TENANT_TOKENMCPAUTHSCAN_TOKENMCPAUTHSCAN_TOKEN_ENDPOINT_AUTH_METHODMCPAUTHSCAN_TOKEN_UNAUTH or --acquire-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: HARNESS, MATRIX, TS_DRIVER
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso decoy.invalid, vata-probe-one.invalid, vata-probe-two.invalid, expected.invalid, schemastore.org, foreign-resource.invalid, evil.example, githubusercontent.com, boardy.invalid, probe.invalid — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names decoy.invalid, vata-probe-one.invalid, vata-probe-two.invalid, expected.invalid, schemastore.org, foreign-resource.invalid, evil.example, githubusercontent.com, boardy.invalid, probe.invalid as well as its own vendor. The guard injects MCP_AUTHSCAN_SIGNING_KEY, MCPAUTHSCAN_CLIENT_ID, MCPAUTHSCAN_CLIENT_SECRET, MCPAUTHSCAN_CROSS_TENANT, MCPAUTHSCAN_FOREIGN_ID, MCPAUTHSCAN_RATE, MCPAUTHSCAN_REDIRECT_URI, MCPAUTHSCAN_TENANT_TOKEN, MCPAUTHSCAN_TOKEN, MCPAUTHSCAN_TOKEN_ENDPOINT_AUTH_METHOD, MCPAUTHSCAN_TOKEN_UNAUTH only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx mcp-authscan

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.1.20

vet-skills diff mcp-authscan 1.1.20 1.1.37

This version reaches for something 1.1.20 did not: 3 new hosts (decoy.invalid, expected.invalid, probe.invalid) · 2 new credential variables (MCPAUTHSCAN_RATE, MCP_AUTHSCAN_SIGNING_KEY). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
decoy.invalid, expected.invalid, probe.invalid
New credential variables
MCPAUTHSCAN_RATE, MCP_AUTHSCAN_SIGNING_KEY

1.1.20 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-22 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp_authscan'
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.5sprocessexited 1: ImportError: attempted relative import with no known parent package
0.5sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.6sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp_authscan'
0.6sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.7sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'mcp_authscan'
0.7sprocess8 of 60 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.7sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/client_check.py:384 · Python subprocess execution detectedchild = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_authscan/content_probe.py:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(?i)(~/\.ssh|id_rsa|/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|\.env\b"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_authscan/monolith.py:1373 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif "@" not in ev and any(seg in pl for seg in (".config.", "/scripts/", "tsdown", "vite.config", "webpack", "rollup", "/config/", ".env.example")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/client_check.py:363 · Python subprocess execution detectedchild = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationmcp_authscan/authorized_scan.py:100 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# No proxy credentials, cookie jar, netrc authentication, or redirect scopeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/conformance_authiss.py:14 · Python subprocess execution detectedpr = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, need(os.path.join(H, "fixture.py")), mode, str(port)], cwd=H, stdout=f, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/conformance_authiss.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=H, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=90)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:1090 · Python subprocess execution detectedcommit_sha = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:1078 · Python subprocess execution detectedrepo_url = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/repository_scan.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/conformance_tokencell.py:4 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "mcp_authscan/conformance_token.py", log, prefix], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:1084 · Python subprocess execution detectedbranch = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/conformance_binding.py:19 · Python subprocess execution detectedpr = subprocess.Popen([sys.executable, need(os.path.join(H, "fixture.py")), mode, str(port)], cwd=H, stdout=f, stderr=subprocess.STDOUT)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/conformance_binding.py:39 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=H, capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=90)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:2998 · Python subprocess execution detectedcommit_hash = subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], cwd="/home/lhmisme/mcp-authscan", text=True).strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/repository_scan.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedclone = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/conformance_metacell.py:4 · Python subprocess execution detectedout = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "mcp_authscan/conformance_meta.py", log, sink], capture_output=True, text=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 65 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.