Skills/PyPI/mcp-authscan

mcp-authscan@1.1.20

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP AuthScan" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher lhmisme420 · publishing for 41 daysInstalls 482Last detonated 8d ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-authscan` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-06 and scored it 74/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Credential pass-through configuration; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.2sprocessexec .venv/bin/mcp-authscan
0.2sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.2sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_cli_packaging.py:41 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files".venv", ".env", ".env.*", "*.db*", "*.sqlite*", "*.key", "*.pem",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:33 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filtering"http://100.64.0.1/token", # CGNAT / TailscaleFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:662 · Python subprocess execution detectedcommit_sha = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL using raw IP addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:11 · URL using raw IP address — may bypass domain-based filteringor `"http://100.64.0.1/..."` (Tailscale/CGNAT) made the scanner issue thatFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationmcp_authscan/authorized_scan.py:100 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials# No proxy credentials, cookie jar, netrc authentication, or redirect scopeFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:2468 · Python subprocess execution detectedcommit_hash = subprocess.check_output(["git", "rev-parse", "--short", "HEAD"], cwd="/home/lhmisme/mcp-authscan", text=True).strip()Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_debug_output.py:18 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(ROOT), stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/repository_scan.py:71 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_authorized_scan.py:136 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesfor target in ("file:///etc/passwd", "https://user:[email protected]",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:650 · Python subprocess execution detectedrepo_url = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:32 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta", # cloud metadata (link-local)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
URL with embedded credentialstests/test_authorized_scan.py:136 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leakingfor target in ("file:///etc/passwd", "https://user:[email protected]",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/repository_scan.py:51 · Python subprocess execution detectedclone = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_dcr_client_source.py:126 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_packaging.py:45 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_coverage_testable.py:25 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(ROOT), capture_output=True, text=True, env=env,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:10 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsA server that answers 401 with `resource_metadata="http://169.254.169.254/..."`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedmcp_authscan/monolith.py:656 · Python subprocess execution detectedbranch = subprocess.check_output(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_authscan/content_probe.py:21 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesr"(?i)(~/\.ssh|id_rsa|/etc/passwd|/etc/shadow|\.env\b"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_packaging.py:105 · Python subprocess execution detectedoutput = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_cli_packaging.py:103 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run([str(pip), "install", "-q", str(editable)], check=True, cwd=temp)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsmcp_authscan/monolith.py:945 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesif "@" not in ev and any(seg in pl for seg in (".config.", "/scripts/", "tsdown", "vite.config", "webpack", "rollup", "/config/", ".env.example")):Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_exit_codes.py:86 · Python subprocess execution detectedhelp_out = subprocess.run(["mcp-authscan", "-h"], capture_output=True).stdoutFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:33 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoring"http://100.64.0.1/token", # CGNAT / TailscaleFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_egress_guard.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"file:///etc/passwd", # not an HTTP fetch at allFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:32 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentials"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta", # cloud metadata (link-local)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_exit_codes.py:43 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["mcp-authscan", "http://127.0.0.1:9999", "--authorized-by", "Test", "--auth-basis", "Test", "--contact", "[email protected]"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
URL to the cloud instance metadata addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:10 · URL to the cloud instance metadata address — reads the VM's credentialsA server that answers 401 with `resource_metadata="http://169.254.169.254/..."`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_verdict_contract.py:82 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(ROOT), capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_verdict_contract.py:287 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run(cmd, cwd=str(ROOT), stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_verdict_contract.py:66 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(cmd, cwd=str(ROOT),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_module_entry.py:14 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(cmd, capture_output=True, env=ENV, stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=60)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_version_parity.py:63 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_halted_scan_exit.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_exit_codes.py:37 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(["mcp-authscan", "http://127.0.0.1:9003", "--authorized-by", "Test", "--auth-basis", "Test", "--contact", "[email protected]"], capture_output=True)Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_verdict_contract.py:186 · Python subprocess execution detectedp = subprocess.Popen(cmd, cwd=str(ROOT), stdin=subprocess.PIPE,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_json_output_file.py:18 · Python subprocess execution detectedproc = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Outbound HTTP to raw IP addresstests/test_egress_guard.py:11 · Outbound HTTP to raw IP address — may bypass domain-based monitoringor `"http://100.64.0.1/..."` (Tailscale/CGNAT) made the scanner issue thatFix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_exit_codes.py:72 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_readme_commands.py:48 · Python subprocess execution detectedr = subprocess.run([sys.executable, "-m", "mcp_authscan", "--help"], capture_output=True,Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedtests/test_exit_codes.py:52 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈40 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for mcp-authscan@1.1.20 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

6 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim lhmisme420: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Credential pass-through configuration≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. New publisher≈ +3 on the totalTime clears this on its own after 14 and 30 days. Claiming the handle (+50) is the fastest way past it.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +2 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. URL using raw IP address≈ +2 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  6. Python subprocess execution detected≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to PyPI, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim lhmisme420Propose a patch to the maintainer