Skills/PyPI/ha-mcp-dev

ha-mcp-dev@9.3.0.dev3663

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Configure and automate Home Assistant with Claude, ChatGPT, and other AI assistants." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher homeassistant-ai · publishing for 381 daysInstalls 40,236Last detonated 34 min ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
HOMEASSISTANT_TOKENMCP_SECRET_PATHMCP_SETTINGS_SECRET_PATHOIDC_CLIENT_SECRETOIDC_JWT_SIGNING_KEYOIDC_VERIFY_ID_TOKENSUPERVISOR_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FLAG, FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS, HA_MCP_BUILD_VERSION, HA_MCP_CONFIG_DIR, HA_MCP_DISABLE_SETTINGS_UI, HA_MCP_EMBEDDED, HAMCP_DEV_SECURITY_POLICY_ACCESS, HAMCP_ENV_FILE, HOMEASSISTANT_URL, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_HEALTHZ, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, OIDC_ALLOWED_CLIENT_REDIRECT_URIS, OIDC_AUDIENCE, OIDC_CLIENT_ID, OIDC_CONFIG_URL, SUPERVISOR_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso homeassistant.local, your-tunnel.com, trycloudflare.com, home-assistant.io, claude.com, cloudflare.com, qc-h.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names homeassistant.local, your-tunnel.com, trycloudflare.com, home-assistant.io, claude.com, cloudflare.com, qc-h.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN, MCP_SECRET_PATH, MCP_SETTINGS_SECRET_PATH, OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, OIDC_JWT_SIGNING_KEY, OIDC_VERIFY_ID_TOKEN, SUPERVISOR_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ha-mcp-dev

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 9.3.0.dev3541

vet-skills diff ha-mcp-dev 9.3.0.dev3541 9.3.0.dev3663

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 9.3.0.dev3541 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

9.3.0.dev3541 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = project_root / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Fallback to default .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:139 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>🐧 Linux</b></summary> Anthropic doesn't ship Claude Desktop for Linux, so pick one path: **Claude Desktop** — free, via the community build: 1. InsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_backup.py:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(includes values loaded from ``.env`` via ``load_dotenv`` atFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:174 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Or create a .env file in the project directory (copy from .env.example)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:1212 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# a warning, since this is a security kill switch and failing open on a typoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Tunneling service URLsrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:1445 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructuremissing.append(" - MCP_BASE_URL (e.g., https://your-tunnel.trycloudflare.com)")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:1223 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processessecurity kill switch it fails **closed**: any value thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = os.getenv("HAMCP_ENV_FILE", ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env file with HAMCP_ENV_FILE supportFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Use absolute path to ensure .env is found regardless of cwdFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:124 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>🍎 macOS</b></summary> 1. Go to [claude.ai](https://claude.ai) and sign in (or create a free account) 2. Open **Terminal** and run: ```sh curl -LsSfFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:166 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>🪟 Windows</b></summary> 1. Go to [claude.ai](https://claude.ai) and sign in (or create a free account) 2. Open **Windows PowerShell** (from Start mFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_overrides.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(includes values loaded from ``.env`` via ``load_dotenv`` atFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/ha_mcp/__init__.py:21 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"sudo apt install python3.14 (Linux)\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim homeassistant-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Tunneling service URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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