Skills/PyPI/ha-mcp-dev

ha-mcp-dev@9.2.0.dev3477

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Configure and automate Home Assistant with Claude, ChatGPT, and other AI assistants." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher homeassistant-ai · publishing for 374 daysInstalls 40,799Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
HOMEASSISTANT_TOKENMCP_SECRET_PATHMCP_SETTINGS_SECRET_PATHOIDC_CLIENT_SECRETOIDC_JWT_SIGNING_KEYOIDC_VERIFY_ID_TOKENSUPERVISOR_TOKENConfiguration, not credentials: FLAG, FORWARDED_ALLOW_IPS, HA_MCP_BUILD_VERSION, HA_MCP_CONFIG_DIR, HA_MCP_DISABLE_SETTINGS_UI, HA_MCP_EMBEDDED, HAMCP_DEV_SECURITY_POLICY_ACCESS, HAMCP_ENV_FILE, HOMEASSISTANT_URL, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_HEALTHZ, MCP_HOST, MCP_PORT, OIDC_ALLOWED_CLIENT_REDIRECT_URIS, OIDC_AUDIENCE, OIDC_CLIENT_ID, OIDC_CONFIG_URL, SUPERVISOR_BASE_URL
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso homeassistant.local, your-tunnel.com, trycloudflare.com, home-assistant.io, claude.com, cloudflare.com, qc-h.net — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names homeassistant.local, your-tunnel.com, trycloudflare.com, home-assistant.io, claude.com, cloudflare.com, qc-h.net as well as its own vendor. The guard injects HOMEASSISTANT_TOKEN, MCP_SECRET_PATH, MCP_SETTINGS_SECRET_PATH, OIDC_CLIENT_SECRET, OIDC_JWT_SIGNING_KEY, OIDC_VERIFY_ID_TOKEN, SUPERVISOR_TOKEN only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx ha-mcp-dev

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_overrides.py:46 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(includes values loaded from ``.env`` via ``load_dotenv`` atFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:6 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Load environment variables from .env file with HAMCP_ENV_FILE supportFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:1237 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processessecurity kill switch it fails **closed**: any value thatFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:7 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Use absolute path to ensure .env is found regardless of cwdFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_backup.py:32 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files(includes values loaded from ``.env`` via ``load_dotenv`` atFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Tunneling service URLsrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:1461 · Tunneling service URL — may route traffic to attacker infrastructuremissing.append(" - MCP_BASE_URL (e.g., https://your-tunnel.trycloudflare.com)")Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:37 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files# Fallback to default .envFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:34 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_file = os.getenv("HAMCP_ENV_FILE", ".env")Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/config_settings.py:38 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv_path = project_root / ".env"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:166 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>🪟 Windows</b></summary> 1. Go to [claude.ai](https://claude.ai) and sign in (or create a free account) 2. Open **Windows PowerShell** (from Start mFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commandsrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:1226 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes# a warning, since this is a security kill switch and failing open on a typoFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:139 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>🐧 Linux</b></summary> Anthropic doesn't ship Claude Desktop for Linux, so pick one path: **Claude Desktop** — free, via the community build: 1. InsFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathssrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:193 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files- Or create a .env file in the project directory (copy from .env.example)Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Collapsed <details> block carrying instructionsREADME.md:124 · Collapsed <details> block carrying instructions<summary><b>🍎 macOS</b></summary> 1. Go to [claude.ai](https://claude.ai) and sign in (or create a free account) 2. Open **Terminal** and run: ```sh curl -LsSfFix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
HIGH
Privileged sudo commandsrc/ha_mcp/__main__.py:14 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privileges"sudo apt install python3.13 (Linux)\n"Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈60 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for ha-mcp-dev@9.2.0.dev3477 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim homeassistant-ai: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Tunneling service URL≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
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