Skills/PyPI/awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server

awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server@0.1.8

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "An AWS Labs Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AWS HealthOmics" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher awslabs · publishing for 596 daysInstalls 2,964Last detonated 20 min ago
$claude mcp add awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server -- uvx awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server
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Coverage

Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.
Tested
8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 0.1.7

vet-skills diff awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server 0.1.7 0.1.8

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.7 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.0sprocessexited 1: ./docker-healthcheck.sh: line 19: pgrep: command not found
0.0sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments
0.1sprocessexec /app/apps/web/node_modules/.bin/git
0.1sprocessexec /root/.cache/node/corepack/v1/pnpm/10.28.0/dist/node-gyp-bin/git
0.1sprocessexec /app/node_modules/.bin/git
0.1sprocessexec /pnpm/git
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/sbin/git
0.1sprocessexec /usr/local/bin/git
0.1sprocessexec /usr/sbin/git
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/git
0.1sprocessexited 1: subprocess.CalledProcessError: Command '['git', 'log', '--format=%H %cs', '--grep=^chore: bump packages for release/', '--', 'pyproject.toml']' returned non-zero exit status 128.
0.1sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'integration'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.2sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'integration'
0.2sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.3sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'integration'
0.3sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'integration'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocessexited 1: ModuleNotFoundError: No module named 'boto3'
0.4sprocessbundled script run in the sandbox with no arguments · not named in the instructions
0.4sprocess8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap)
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.4sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``os.devnull`` so a developer's ``~/.aws/config`` (including anyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/changelog_release.py:100 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessanitize_local_path('../../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('foo/../../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_inbound_explicit.py:36 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keyFAKE_ACCESS_KEY_ID = 'AKIAFAKEEXAMPLE12345' # pragma: allowlist secretFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_path_traversal.py:149 · OS command execution function call detected'import os; os.system("echo pwned")',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_content_resolver.py:1171 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('foo/bar/../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('a/b/c/../../../../etc/shadow')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedintegration/deploy/cli.py:250 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_path_traversal.py:428 · OS command execution function call detected'import os; os.system("echo pwned")'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_path_traversal.py:406 · OS command execution function call detected'import os; os.system("echo pwned")'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:71 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod o+x /rootFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:121 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdata = self._make_zip_with_entry('../../../etc/passwd', 'malicious')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/changelog_release.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_content_resolver.py:1163 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPaths like 'foo/bar/../../etc/passwd' where '..' is not caught by theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.