awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server@0.1.8
VERIFIED· install onlyPublisher claims: "An AWS Labs Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AWS HealthOmics" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle.- Tested
- 8 of 10 bundled scripts run with no arguments (the rest were not run: per-bundle cap), with decoy credentials in the environment · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- use of the skill by an agent
Connect it under the guard. Bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.1.7
vet-skills diff awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server 0.1.7 0.1.8In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.1.7 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; bundled scripts ran with no arguments; no agent task scenario for this bundle) on 2026-11-17 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 1 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
``os.devnull`` so a developer's ``~/.aws/config`` (including anyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.sanitize_local_path('../../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.validate_local_path('../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.validate_local_path('foo/../../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.FAKE_ACCESS_KEY_ID = 'AKIAFAKEEXAMPLE12345' # pragma: allowlist secretFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.'import os; os.system("echo pwned")',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.validate_local_path('foo/bar/../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.validate_local_path('a/b/c/../../../../etc/shadow')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.completed = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.'import os; os.system("echo pwned")'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.'import os; os.system("echo pwned")'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.chmod o+x /rootFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.data = self._make_zip_with_entry('../../../etc/passwd', 'malicious')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Paths like 'foo/bar/../../etc/passwd' where '..' is not caught by theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.