Skills/PyPI/awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server

awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server@0.1.7

VERIFIED· install only

Publisher claims: "An AWS Labs Model Context Protocol (MCP) server for AWS HealthOmics" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry PyPI (MCP server)Publisher awslabs · publishing for 593 daysInstalls 2,521Last detonated 5d ago
$claude mcp add awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server -- uvx awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server
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Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the code
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Connect it under the guard. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. The code names no credential variable; the guard pins the network to what the honeypot saw and logs every call.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- uvx awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 87/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/conftest.py:73 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files``os.devnull`` so a developer's ``~/.aws/config`` (including anyFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandDockerfile:71 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod o+x /rootFix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/changelog_release.py:100 · Python subprocess execution detectedsubprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedscripts/changelog_release.py:73 · Python subprocess execution detectedreturn subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detectedintegration/deploy/cli.py:250 · Python subprocess execution detectedcompleted = subprocess.run(Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_content_resolver.py:1171 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('foo/bar/../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_content_resolver.py:1163 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesPaths like 'foo/bar/../../etc/passwd' where '..' is not caught by theFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
AWS access key pattern detectedtests/test_inbound_explicit.py:36 · AWS access key pattern detected — possible hardcoded or harvested keyFAKE_ACCESS_KEY_ID = 'AKIAFAKEEXAMPLE12345' # pragma: allowlist secretFix: Never read or enumerate credential locations; accept a documented environment variable instead.
AST03
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_path_traversal.py:428 · OS command execution function call detected'import os; os.system("echo pwned")'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:87 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('a/b/c/../../../../etc/shadow')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:101 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filessanitize_local_path('../../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_path_traversal.py:149 · OS command execution function call detected'import os; os.system("echo pwned")',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:121 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesdata = self._make_zip_with_entry('../../../etc/passwd', 'malicious')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
OS command execution function call detectedtests/test_path_traversal.py:406 · OS command execution function call detected'import os; os.system("echo pwned")'Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:55 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('foo/../../../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Access to sensitive file pathstests/test_path_traversal.py:50 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvalidate_local_path('../etc/passwd')Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server@0.1.7 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

awslabs.aws-healthomics-mcp-server@0.1.7 safety verdict: Verified (install only) — KillerSkills