warden-mcp@0.2.74
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Vaultwarden/Bitwarden MCP server backed by Bitwarden CLI (bw)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
BW_CLIENTSECRETor--clientsecretConfiguration, not credentials: BW_BIN, BW_CLIENTID, BW_UNLOCK_INTERVAL, BW_USER, BW_USERNAME, KEYCHAIN_ALLOW_ENV_FALLBACK, KEYCHAIN_BW_HOME_ROOT, KEYCHAIN_DEBUG_BW, KEYCHAIN_DEBUG_HTTP, KEYCHAIN_MAX_HEAP_USED_MB, KEYCHAIN_METRICS_LOG_INTERVAL_MS, KEYCHAIN_SESSION_MAX_COUNT, KEYCHAIN_SESSION_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS, KEYCHAIN_SESSION_TTL_MS, KEYCHAIN_SYNC_ON_WRITE, KEYCHAIN_TEXT_COMPAT_MODE, MCP_APP_NAME, TOOL_PREFIX, TOOL_SEPARATOR, WARDEN_MCP_HOST, WARDEN_MCP_STDIO- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for BW_CLIENTSECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 0.2.71
vet-skills diff warden-mcp 0.2.71 0.2.74In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 0.2.71 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 40 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const manager = new BwSessionManager({ ...env, homeDir });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.return { ...config, ...credentials };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Fallback to direct child kill below.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.