warden-mcp@0.2.71
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Vaultwarden/Bitwarden MCP server backed by Bitwarden CLI (bw)." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
BW_CLIENTSECRETor--clientsecretConfiguration, not credentials: BW_BIN, BW_CLIENTID, BW_UNLOCK_INTERVAL, BW_USER, BW_USERNAME, KEYCHAIN_ALLOW_ENV_FALLBACK, KEYCHAIN_BW_HOME_ROOT, KEYCHAIN_DEBUG_BW, KEYCHAIN_DEBUG_HTTP, KEYCHAIN_MAX_HEAP_USED_MB, KEYCHAIN_METRICS_LOG_INTERVAL_MS, KEYCHAIN_SESSION_MAX_COUNT, KEYCHAIN_SESSION_SWEEP_INTERVAL_MS, KEYCHAIN_SESSION_TTL_MS, KEYCHAIN_SYNC_ON_WRITE, KEYCHAIN_TEXT_COMPAT_MODE, MCP_APP_NAME, TOOL_PREFIX, TOOL_SEPARATOR, WARDEN_MCP_HOST, WARDEN_MCP_STDIO- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for BW_CLIENTSECRET and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 89/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 37 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
return { ...config, ...credentials };Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const manager = new BwSessionManager({ ...env, homeDir });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.// Fallback to direct child kill below.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @icoretech/warden-mcp@0.2.71 as of 21 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.