Skills/npm/vibeview

vibeview@0.76.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "VibeView CLI -- run your app on cloud iOS simulators, Android emulators, Apple TV, Android TV and Roku devices: a React Native dev loop, device control for you or your coding agent (CLI or MCP), and tests from CI" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher vibeview · publishing for 113 daysInstalls 10,363Last detonated 3d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VIBEVIEW_API_TOKEN or --sign-in-password-fileConfiguration, not credentials: BITRISE_BUILD_URL, BITRISE_GIT_BRANCH, BITRISE_GIT_COMMIT, BITRISE_IO, CI_COMMIT_REF_NAME, CI_COMMIT_SHA, CI_JOB_URL, CI_MERGE_REQUEST_SOURCE_BRANCH_NAME, CI_PIPELINE_URL, CIRCLE_BRANCH, CIRCLE_BUILD_URL, CIRCLE_SHA1, CIRCLECI, CODEX_HOME, ENV_KEY_RE, GIT_CLONE_COMMIT_HASH, GITHUB_ACTIONS, GITHUB_EVENT_PATH, GITHUB_HEAD_REF, GITHUB_REF_NAME, GITHUB_REPOSITORY, GITHUB_RUN_ID, GITHUB_SERVER_URL, GITHUB_SHA, GITLAB_CI, NO_UPDATE_NOTIFIER, VIBEVIEW_BASE_URL, VIBEVIEW_DEBUG, VIBEVIEW_NO_UPDATE_CHECK, VIBEVIEW_QUEUE_WAIT_MS, VIBEVIEW_WEB_URL
Where it talks to
vibeview.io (its own)Also gradle.org, android.com, tanstack.com, apple.com, claude.com, cursor.com, chatgpt.com, visualstudio.com, devin.ai — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names gradle.org, android.com, tanstack.com, apple.com, claude.com, cursor.com, chatgpt.com, visualstudio.com, devin.ai as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VIBEVIEW_API_TOKEN only into requests to vibeview.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets VIBEVIEW_API_TOKEN=vibeview.io -- npx -y vibeview

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 32 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
12sprocessdependency install exit 0
32sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · SELECT in one step. focus [options] <ref> TV: move focus to an element without activating it. help [command] display help for command
32sprocessscript backend runs setup only
32sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:809 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env !== void 0 ? { env } : {},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:170 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesbuild command in `vibeview.json` builds and uploads the app itself (thisFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:2026 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst prefix = `${installCommand(cwd)} && ${web ? `${web} && ` : ""}npx cap sync ${platform} && `;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:5285 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…, "Bare: build and upload first (uses platforms.<platform>.build from vibeview.json). With an id: run that uploaded debug build instead of the newest one (any build with --standalone) (see `vib…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:1042 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`vibeview.json: platforms.${platformKey}.${at}.env must be an object of string values`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:1036 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`vibeview.json: platforms.${platformKey}.${at}.env must be an object of string values`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:86 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeit, `npx --yes yarn@1 install --frozen-lockfile`: the builders' defaultFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:2076 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codevar YARN1_VIA_NPX = "npx --yes yarn@1";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:4074 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvar EXPO_PUBLIC_REF = /\bprocess\.env\.(EXPO_PUBLIC_[A-Za-z0-9_]+)/g;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:102 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx expo start`. Ready-made commands per framework:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:24 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ibeview dev --build`. It runs the `development` profile's command from `vibeview.json` here, uploads the result, then starts the session. `vibeview build` builds and uploads without a session. | | The same kind of change, but no Mac or no …Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:155 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code(`yarn start`, `npx expo start` or equivalent) and leave it running. NotFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:2763 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn `No package.json in ${dir}. Run vibeview build from your project root. (Your build command runs \`${pm}\` there; nothing was uploaded or charged.)`;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/server-2HRZPZ7M.js:1438 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime`dev_reload is for Roku channels; ${platformWithArticle(target.platform)} session hot-reloads through Metro on its own`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-SQFYQWUE.js:530 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* the CLI's engines floor is >=20, see package.json) — mirrors uploadBuild'sFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/cli.js:1467 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime`dev-reload is for Roku channels; ${platformWithArticle(state.platform)} session hot-reloads through Metro on its own.`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:5000 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst uploadSpinner = !opts.json ? createSpinner("uploading source...") : null;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:2122 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codevar IOS_PREBUILD = "npx expo prebuild --platform ios && ";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/server-2HRZPZ7M.js:287 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ription: "Roku only: re-package the channel with the build command from vibeview.json (platforms.roku.build), upload it, and reload it into the session dev_start is holding (or, with no held sessi…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:1047 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`vibeview.json: platforms.${platformKey}.${at}.env key "${envKey}" is not a valid environment variable name (must match ${ENV_KEY_RE})`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:2124 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn `${installCommand(cwd)} && npx expo prebuild --platform android --no-install && cd android && ./gradlew assembleDebug`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:5555 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Write plain/sensitive variable values to a .env file (secrets and files are never included)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:26 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…uilt. Required: a `platforms.roku.build.profiles.development` entry in `vibeview.json` (`command` packages the zip, `artifact` is its path). Without it `vibeview dev --platform roku` refuses to start. With it, `vibeview dev --platform roku…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:7425 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesopts.log("Uploading package\u2026");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:2159 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst metroCommand = flavor === "expo" ? "npx expo start" : "yarn start";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/cli.js:2662 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod as chmodAsync,Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:2632 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"# Values are quoted/escaped only where the .env format requires it."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:2606 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files… const why = v.value.includes("\r") ? "contains a carriage return, which the .env format normalizes away" : "contains a single quote, a double quote and a backti…Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:100 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codesame command. Never use `npx expo run:ios` / `run:android` as a cloud buildFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:2595 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst outPath = opts.out ?? ".env";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:99 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx expo prebuild --platform <p>` followed by `xcodebuild` or Gradle in theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuntracked file `.gitignore` doesn't exclude, so a stray local `.env` goesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencydist/chunk-AVRCVORP.js:3256 · Unpinned dependencyreturn `A newer vibeview is available: ${current} \u2192 ${latest}. Run \`npm i -g vibeview@latest\`, or \`npx vibeview@latest ...\`.`;Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:507 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…app's newest release build. Not on Roku. | | `build --cloud` | Build a `vibeview.json` profile on a cloud builder and add the result to the app's builds: `--platform <p>\|all`, `--profile <name>`, `--json` (NDJSON; `build_finished` carries…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈10,071 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for vibeview@0.76.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vibeview: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim vibeviewPropose a patch to the maintainer