Skills/npm/vibeview

vibeview@0.75.0

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "VibeView CLI -- run your app on cloud iOS simulators, Android emulators, Apple TV, Android TV and Roku devices: a React Native dev loop, device control for you or your coding agent (CLI or MCP), and tests from CI" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher vibeview · publishing for 113 daysInstalls 10,363Last detonated 7d ago
What would fix thisWatchDispute verdict

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
use of the skill by an agent

Not enough was observed to say yet. Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try vibeview` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 73/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli.js:5285 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files"Bare: build and upload first (uses platforms.<platform>.build from vibeview.json). With an id: run that uploaded debug build instead of the newest one (any build with --standalone) (see `vibeview lisFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:100 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codesame command. Never use `npx expo run:ios` / `run:android` as a cloud buildFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:58 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesuntracked file `.gitignore` doesn't exclude, so a stray local `.env` goesFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:4059 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvar EXPO_PUBLIC_REF = /\bprocess\.env\.(EXPO_PUBLIC_[A-Za-z0-9_]+)/g;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File permission modification commanddist/cli.js:2662 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissionschmod as chmodAsync,Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-7YGF2DZ6.js:530 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files* the CLI's engines floor is >=20, see package.json) — mirrors uploadBuild'sFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:4985 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconst uploadSpinner = !opts.json ? createSpinner("uploading source...") : null;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:2751 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesreturn `No package.json in ${dir}. Run vibeview build from your project root. (Your build command runs \`${pm}\` there; nothing was uploaded or charged.)`;Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:86 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeit, `npx --yes yarn@1 install --frozen-lockfile`: the builders' defaultFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:7410 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesopts.log("Uploading package\u2026");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:1047 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`vibeview.json: platforms.${platformKey}.${at}.env key "${envKey}" is not a valid environment variable name (must match ${ENV_KEY_RE})`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:2632 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"# Values are quoted/escaped only where the .env format requires it."Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:2073 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codevar YARN1_VIA_NPX = "npx --yes yarn@1";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:5555 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files"Write plain/sensitive variable values to a .env file (secrets and files are never included)"Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:809 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env !== void 0 ? { env } : {},Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:1042 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`vibeview.json: platforms.${platformKey}.${at}.env must be an object of string values`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:2121 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn `${installCommand(cwd)} && npx expo prebuild --platform android --no-install && cd android && ./gradlew assembleDebug`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/server-WP2QFU3E.js:287 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdescription: "Roku only: re-package the channel with the build command from vibeview.json (platforms.roku.build), upload it, and reload it into the session dev_start is holding (or, with no held sessiFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/server-WP2QFU3E.js:1438 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime`dev_reload is for Roku channels; ${platformWithArticle(target.platform)} session hot-reloads through Metro on its own`Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:99 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx expo prebuild --platform <p>` followed by `xcodebuild` or Gradle in theFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/cli.js:1467 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtime`dev-reload is for Roku channels; ${platformWithArticle(state.platform)} session hot-reloads through Metro on its own.`,Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:2595 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst outPath = opts.out ?? ".env";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:2023 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst prefix = `${installCommand(cwd)} && ${web ? `${web} && ` : ""}npx cap sync ${platform} && `;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:2156 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst metroCommand = flavor === "expo" ? "npx expo start" : "yarn start";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:1036 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`vibeview.json: platforms.${platformKey}.${at}.env must be an object of string values`Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:2119 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codevar IOS_PREBUILD = "npx expo prebuild --platform ios && ";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli.js:2606 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesconst why = v.value.includes("\r") ? "contains a carriage return, which the .env format normalizes away" : "contains a single quote, a double quote and a backtick, which no .env quoting form can carryFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
LOW
Unpinned dependencydist/chunk-BK2O6EFI.js:3242 · Unpinned dependencyreturn `A newer vibeview is available: ${current} \u2192 ${latest}. Run \`npm i -g vibeview@latest\`, or \`npx vibeview@latest ...\`.`;Fix: Pin the exact version (`[email protected]`, `==1.2.3`) so every install gets the bytes that were reviewed.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:155 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code(`yarn start`, `npx expo start` or equivalent) and leave it running. NotFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:170 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesbuild command in `vibeview.json` builds and uploads the app itself (thisFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:102 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code`npx expo start`. Ready-made commands per framework:Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:24 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| A native change in a React Native/Expo app, or any code change in a Flutter, Capacitor, Kotlin Multiplatform or native app, and this machine can build it (Xcode for iOS/Apple TV) | `vibeview dev --bFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:26 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| Roku channel | Not cloud-built. Required: a `platforms.roku.build.profiles.development` entry in `vibeview.json` (`command` packages the zip, `artifact` is its path). Without it `vibeview dev --platFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionskills/vibeview-agent/SKILL.md:507 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files| `build --cloud` | Build a `vibeview.json` profile on a cloud builder and add the result to the app's builds: `--platform <p>\|all`, `--profile <name>`, `--json` (NDJSON; `build_finished` carries `apFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈10,071 tok
1 file · 8 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for vibeview@0.75.0 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

7 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim vibeview: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  3. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim vibeviewPropose a patch to the maintainer