ssh-mcp-pro@1.7.3
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) SSH client server for remote automation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSAUTH_ALLOW_ALL_USERSAUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_IDSAUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_LOGINSAUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILSAUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_SUB_IDSAUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDSCONTROL_PLANE_SIGNING_KEY_PATHDATABASE_URLENROLLMENT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSGITHUB_CLIENT_SECRETGOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRETJWT_SIGNING_KEY_PATHOAUTH_DCR_MAX_CLIENTSSSH_AUTH_SOCKSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMANDSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_ARGSSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MSSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_PROVIDERSSH_MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODESSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKENSSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN_FILESSH_MCP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_ALGORITHMSSSH_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCESSH_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUERSSH_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URLSSH_MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPESSSH_MCP_OAUTH_RESOURCESSHAUTOMATOR_DATABASE_URLor--bearer-token-file/--connector-credential-providerConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_WS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS, AGENT_WS_HELLO_TIMEOUT_MS, AGENT_WS_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS, AGENT_WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS, AGENT_WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_AGENT, AGENT_WS_PATH, GITHUB_CALLBACK_URL, GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_CALLBACK_URL, GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID, LOG_FORMAT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, AUTH_ALLOW_ALL_USERS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_IDS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_LOGINS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_SUB_IDS, AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS, CONTROL_PLANE_SIGNING_KEY_PATH, DATABASE_URL, ENROLLMENT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET, GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_PATH, OAUTH_DCR_MAX_CLIENTS, SSH_AUTH_SOCK, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_ARGS, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER, SSH_MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE, SSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN, SSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN_FILE, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URL, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_RESOURCE, SSHAUTOMATOR_DATABASE_URL and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.7.2
vet-skills diff ssh-mcp-pro 1.7.2 1.7.3In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.7.2 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-16 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 42 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
throw createFilesystemError(`Failed to move temporary file to ${filePath}`, "Check file permissions and sudo access");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.pathDenyPrefixes: ["/etc/sudoers", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "/boot", "/dev", "/proc"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.* Parses ~/.ssh/config file and resolves host configurations.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.reason: "Raw sudo command execution is disabled by policy",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.throw createSudoError("Sudo is not supported on Windows hosts", "Use an elevated session instead of sudo commands");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.description: "Parsed host aliases from the local ~/.ssh/config cache",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.throw wrapError(error, ErrorCode.ENOSUDO, "Failed to execute sudo command on remote system");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const prefixed = `sudo -n ${sudoCommand}`;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return new SSHMCPError(ErrorCode.ENOSUDO, message, hint, "Root/sudo privileges are required but not available.", true, "Configure a restricted NOPASSWD sudoers profile for approved commands");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.throw createSudoError("Password-based sudo through MCP inputs is disabled", "Configure a restricted NOPASSWD sudoers allowlist for approved commands.");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.const chmodCommand = mode !== undefined ? `chmod ${mode.toString(8)} ${shellQuote(tempPath)}\n` : "";Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts."Call out destructive operations, sudo needs, path policy, rollback, and commands/files that would change.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." Enroll remote agent: npx --yes --package ssh-mcp-pro@latest ssh-mcp-pro-agent enroll --server <url> --token <token> --alias <alias>",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* Creates a sudo errorFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Creates a sudo errorFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Parses ~/.ssh/config file and resolves host configurations.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.logger.debug("Executing sudo command", {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell." Run remote agent: npx --yes --package ssh-mcp-pro@latest ssh-mcp-pro-agent run",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim oaslananka: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.