ssh-mcp-pro@1.5.0
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Model Context Protocol (MCP) SSH client server for remote automation" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSAUTH_ALLOW_ALL_USERSAUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_IDSAUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_LOGINSAUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILSAUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_SUB_IDSAUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDSCONTROL_PLANE_SIGNING_KEY_PATHDATABASE_URLENROLLMENT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDSGITHUB_CLIENT_SECRETGOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRETJWT_SIGNING_KEY_PATHOAUTH_DCR_MAX_CLIENTSSSH_AUTH_SOCKSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMANDSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_ARGSSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MSSSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_PROVIDERSSH_MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODESSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKENSSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN_FILESSH_MCP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_ALGORITHMSSSH_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCESSH_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUERSSH_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URLSSH_MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPESSSH_MCP_OAUTH_RESOURCESSHAUTOMATOR_DATABASE_URLor--bearer-token-file/--connector-credential-providerConfiguration, not credentials: AGENT_WS_HEARTBEAT_INTERVAL_MS, AGENT_WS_HELLO_TIMEOUT_MS, AGENT_WS_IDLE_TIMEOUT_MS, AGENT_WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS, AGENT_WS_MAX_CONNECTIONS_PER_AGENT, AGENT_WS_PATH, GITHUB_CALLBACK_URL, GITHUB_CLIENT_ID, GOOGLE_CALLBACK_URL, GOOGLE_CLIENT_ID, LOG_FORMAT- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the code
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard. It asks for ACCESS_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, AUTH_ALLOW_ALL_USERS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_IDS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GITHUB_LOGINS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_EMAILS, AUTH_ALLOWED_GOOGLE_SUB_IDS, AUTH_CODE_TTL_SECONDS, CONTROL_PLANE_SIGNING_KEY_PATH, DATABASE_URL, ENROLLMENT_TOKEN_TTL_SECONDS, GITHUB_CLIENT_SECRET, GOOGLE_CLIENT_SECRET, JWT_SIGNING_KEY_PATH, OAUTH_DCR_MAX_CLIENTS, SSH_AUTH_SOCK, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_ARGS, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_COMMAND_TIMEOUT_MS, SSH_MCP_CONNECTOR_CREDENTIAL_PROVIDER, SSH_MCP_HTTP_AUTH_MODE, SSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN, SSH_MCP_HTTP_BEARER_TOKEN_FILE, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_ALLOWED_ALGORITHMS, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_ISSUER, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_JWKS_URL, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_REQUIRED_SCOPES, SSH_MCP_OAUTH_RESOURCE, SSHAUTOMATOR_DATABASE_URL and talks to its vendor. Give the credential to the guard, not the server: the value never enters the server's environment and only travels to the host you bind. What the tools do with a real credential was not observed.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-12 and scored it 76/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 42 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
* Creates a sudo errorFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Creates a sudo errorFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.throw createFilesystemError(`Failed to move temporary file to ${filePath}`, "Check file permissions and sudo access");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.pathDenyPrefixes: ["/etc/sudoers", "/etc/shadow", "/etc/passwd", "/boot", "/dev", "/proc"],Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose." Run remote agent: npx --yes --package ssh-mcp-pro@latest ssh-mcp-pro-agent run",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.throw createSudoError("Password-based sudo through MCP inputs is disabled", "Configure a restricted NOPASSWD sudoers allowlist for approved commands.");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.throw wrapError(error, ErrorCode.ENOSUDO, "Failed to execute sudo command on remote system");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.reason: "Raw sudo command execution is disabled by policy",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.throw createSudoError("Sudo is not supported on Windows hosts", "Use an elevated session instead of sudo commands");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.* Parses ~/.ssh/config file and resolves host configurations.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const chmodCommand = mode !== undefined ? `chmod ${mode.toString(8)} ${shellQuote(tempPath)}\n` : "";Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.const prefixed = `sudo -n ${sudoCommand}`;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out." Enroll remote agent: npx --yes --package ssh-mcp-pro@latest ssh-mcp-pro-agent enroll --server <url> --token <token> --alias <alias>",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* Parses ~/.ssh/config file and resolves host configurations.Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.description: "Parsed host aliases from the local ~/.ssh/config cache",Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose."Call out destructive operations, sudo needs, path policy, rollback, and commands/files that would change.",Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.return new SSHMCPError(ErrorCode.ENOSUDO, message, hint, "Root/sudo privileges are required but not available.", true, "Configure a restricted NOPASSWD sudoers profile for approved commands");Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.logger.debug("Executing sudo command", {Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for ssh-mcp-pro@1.5.0 as of 2d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
4 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim oaslananka: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.