Skills/npm/runner

runner@0.3.74

CAUTION· install only

Publisher claims: "Make your computer and your agents Cloop machines: device login, the machine daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher cloop · publishing for 44 daysInstalls 11,281Last detonated 21 min ago

Coverage

Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.
Tested
every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
use of the skill by an agent

What changed since 0.3.68

vet-skills diff runner 0.3.68 0.3.74

This version reaches for something 0.3.68 did not: 1 new host (workers.dev). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

New hosts
workers.dev

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.0sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-24RGSNM4.js:1561 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv: { ...process.env, ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patterndist/chunk-24RGSNM4.js:240 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code] : ["sh", "-c", "curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash"];Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/chunk-24RGSNM4.js:2163 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesreturn { ok: false, command: `sudo loginctl enable-linger ${user}` };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-CSCM7POV.js:141 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesreturn unitEnv({ ...env, CLOOP_ORIGIN: origin, CLOOP_MESH_URL: env.CLOOP_MESH_URL || origin });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-JMX6TDUW.js:158 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files…ached from your shell (for example \`nohup npm run dev -- --port 5173 > /tmp/dev.log 2>&1 &\`), and check it answers on its port. Then list it as an output: {"kind": "preview", "title": "The new sign-in page", "port": 5173, "path": "/s…Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-ZM7YNEFW.js:232 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesdeps.log(`[runner:media] sent work=${workId} class=${output.kind}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-24RGSNM4.js:2046 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst base = script.includes("/_npx/") ? "npx -y @cloop/runner@latest" : "cloop";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:3838 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst npx = findNpx();Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/disconnect-ACQ7JZFL.js:47 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn `This computer is no longer a ${env} Cloop machine. To connect it again: ${["npx -y @cloop/runner@latest connect", ENVIRONMENTS[env].flag].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:284 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesobj(await this.json("POST", `/v1/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/${command}`, body)).receiptFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shelldist/chunk-24RGSNM4.js:240 · Remote installer piped to shell] : ["sh", "-c", "curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash"];Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:1357 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data files(r) => this.log(`send thread=${thread} after its prompt delivered=${r.delivered}`),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:38 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsup && chmod 644 dist/*.js && chmod 755 dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-CSCM7POV.js:222 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env.map(([key, value]) => `set "${key}=${cmdValue(value)}"`),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-CSCM7POV.js:86 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codereturn "npx is not on PATH, so the service cannot run Cloop. Install Node.js with npm, which ships npx, and run `cloop connect` again.";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-MBH7TEHP.js:2092 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesenv: { ...process.env, ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-CSCM7POV.js:97 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codevar NPX = process.platform === "win32" ? "npx.cmd" : "npx";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:1327 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesthis.log(`send thread=${id} waits for its run's prompt`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:3816 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeconst npx = findNpx();Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:3913 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeasync function adopt(from, kind, { services: given, script = process.argv[1] ?? "cloop", npx = findNpx() } = {}) {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:3840 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codelog(`npx is not on PATH, so ${to} cannot start`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-CSCM7POV.js:270 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files...env.map(([key, value]) => `Environment=${systemdAssignment(`${key}=${value}`)}`),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/box-ER6RLOUR.js:279 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesobj(await this.json("POST", "/v1/sessions", { ...body, command_guard_enabled: false })).receiptFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 42 in bundle

Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.

What would make this Verified

12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cloop: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  5. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim cloopPropose a patch to the maintainer