runner@0.3.55
CAUTION· install onlyPublisher claims: "Make your computer and your agents Cloop machines: device login, the machine daemon, the Cloop MCP server, and Claude Code hooks." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only.- Tested
- every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- use of the skill by an agent
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (1 scenario; nothing executable in the bundle ran; the trace covers the install step only) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 68/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Privileged sudo command; Access to sensitive file paths. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 0 s · 1 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
const npx = findNpx();Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.] : ["sh", "-c", "curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash"];Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.return { ok: false, command: `sudo loginctl enable-linger ${user}` };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.async function adopt(from, kind, { services: given, script = process.argv[1] ?? "cloop", npx = findNpx() } = {}) {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return parseReceipt(obj(await this.json("POST", "/v1/sessions", body)).receipt);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return unitEnv({ ...env, CLOOP_ORIGIN: origin, CLOOP_MESH_URL: env.CLOOP_MESH_URL || origin });Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.const npx = findNpx();Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.log(`npx is not on PATH, so ${to} cannot start`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time....env.map(([key, value]) => `Environment=${systemdAssignment(`${key}=${value}`)}`),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose....env.map(([key, value]) => `set "${key}=${cmdValue(value)}"`),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.env: { ...process.env, ...env },Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.this.log(`send thread=${id} waits for its run's prompt`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why."build": "tsup && chmod 644 dist/*.js && chmod 755 dist/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.(r) => this.log(`send thread=${thread} after its prompt delivered=${r.delivered}`),Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.`To let the owner open a web app or page you are running on this machine, such as a dev server, leave the server running after your turn ends: start it in the background, detached from your shell (forFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.return "npx is not on PATH, so the service cannot run Cloop. Install it with `npm install -g @cloop/runner` and run `cloop connect` again.";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.obj(await this.json("POST", `/v1/sessions/${encodeURIComponent(id)}/${command}`, body)).receiptFix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.const base = script.includes("/_npx/") ? "npx -y @cloop/runner@latest" : "cloop";Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.return `This computer is no longer a ${env} Cloop machine. To connect it again: ${["npx -y @cloop/runner@latest connect", ENVIRONMENTS[env].flag].filter(Boolean).join(" ")}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.] : ["sh", "-c", "curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash"];Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. Skills load their instruction text when triggered; the figure is what that costs.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @cloop/runner@0.3.55 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
12 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim cloop: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
- Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.