Skills/npm/pushary

pushary@1.9.219

CAUTION· not started

Publisher claims: "Human-in-the-loop (HITL) for AI agents: ask a person for approvals or answers by push notification. One command connects Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher github actions · publishing for 420 daysInstalls 24,961Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
PUSHARY_API_KEY or --no-ask-password / --with-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: ANSWER_PATH_SUFFIX, APPROVALS_PATH, BUILD_TAG, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, CLIENT_REPORT_PATH, CODEX_EVENT_KEY, CODEX_HOME, DEVICE_KEY_PATH, DISPLAY, EXECUTOR_NUMBER, GROK_SESSION_ID, HERMES_COMMAND_ALLOWLIST_KEY, HERMES_GATE_TOOLS_KEY, HERMES_HOME, IDENTITY_PATH, JENKINS_HOME, MACHINES_PATH, OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR, PATHEXT, ProgramFiles, ProgramW6432, PUSHARY_ADMISSION_FILE, PUSHARY_AGENT_NAME, PUSHARY_API_URL, PUSHARY_APP_REGISTER_TIMEOUT_MS, PUSHARY_AUTO_DECISION_BEACON, PUSHARY_AUTO_NOTIFY_SESSION_END, PUSHARY_BASE_URL, PUSHARY_BELL_QUIET, PUSHARY_BELL_UPGRADE_AT, PUSHARY_CLAUDE_BIN, PUSHARY_COMMAND_DIR, PUSHARY_CONFIG_FILE, PUSHARY_GATE_TIMEOUT_MS, PUSHARY_MCP_PATH_PREFIX, PUSHARY_MODEL_PRICING, PUSHARY_NO_BROWSER, PUSHARY_RECEIPTS, PUSHARY_SPAWN_ID
Where it talks to
pushary.com (its own)Also nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nodejs.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PUSHARY_API_KEY only into requests to pushary.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets PUSHARY_API_KEY=pushary.com -- npx -y pushary

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.9.150

vet-skills diff pushary 1.9.150 1.9.219

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.9.150 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

No longer contacted
apple.com, claude.ai, discord.gg, microsoft.com

1.9.150 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 70/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration; Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 2 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
2.1sprocessdependency install exit 1 · npm error code EUNSUPPORTEDPROTOCOL npm error Unsupported URL Type "workspace:": workspace:* npm error A complete log of this run can be found in: /tmp/ks-detonate-vAijaL/task/home/.npm/_logs/2026-11-20T22_38_15_415Z-debug-0.log
2.1sclaimednot started: dependency install failed (exit 1); the server itself was not observed
2.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
2.2sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-G6HBBR6G.js:98 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeconst offReason = autoUpdateOffReason(input);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-ALBZHD3K.js:1626 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"\`npx pushary@latest setup\` with the key Hermes uses, or Session history turned on in the Pushary Mac app")Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-ANENQIII.js:2323 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif (mode?.kill || mode?.mode === "terminal_only") return;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP)dist/chunk-NJGZLUXW.js:814 · MCP server using network transport (SSE/HTTP) — data sent over network…ray(value)) return false; const snapshot = value; return typeof snapshot.hadMcpServers === "boolean" && typeof snapshot.mcpServersWasRecord === "boolean" && (!snapshot.hadMcpServers || snapshot.mcpServersWasRecord || Object.hasOwn(snapshot…Fix: Namespace tool names and keep tool descriptions literal; no instructions to the agent inside them.
AST04
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-NJGZLUXW.js:1299 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateState = () => join7(pusharyDir(), "auto-update.json");Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-43GTIQA6.js:301 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` ${dim("A browser on this computer is subscribed, but no phone is connected yet.")}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddist/chunk-ALBZHD3K.js:1897 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run([*helper, "authorize-export"],Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-G6HBBR6G.js:60 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateOffReason = (input) => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-ANENQIII.js:1916 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code// `npx ... doctor` reports npx for that invocation and claude_plugin asFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Python subprocess execution detecteddist/chunk-ALBZHD3K.js:2054 · Python subprocess execution detectedresult = subprocess.run(command, input=json.dumps(payload), text=True, env=_registration_environment(key),Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/chunk-ALBZHD3K.js:2612 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code…ugins/pushary` and selects Pushary as the approval transport. On any computer, `npx pushary@latest setup --agents hermes` does the same. The plugin can also come from the Hermes …Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Destructive file system command detecteddist/chunk-ALBZHD3K.js:2612 · Destructive file system command detected…n**Example - dangerous command approval:**\n\n```json\n{\n "question": "Allow: rm -rf /tmp/build-artifacts/*",\n "type": "confirm",\n "context": "Cleaning up 2.3GB o…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/chunk-NJGZLUXW.js:1245 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvar ENVIRONMENT_FILE_NAME = ".env";Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/chunk-43GTIQA6.js:828 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log(` ${dim('This computer keeps its own key. Revoke the extra "Paired agent (mobile)" key at')} ${cyan("pushary.com/dashboard/agent/settings")}${dim(".")}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-G6HBBR6G.js:102 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimeif (checkedWithinInterval(input.state.lastCheckAt, input.now, autoUpdateCheckInterval(input.state))) return { kind: "skip", reason: "checked_recently" };Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-JWRV7KGV.js:196 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes…ools (grep, list_dir, glob, read_file, todo_write, search_tool) only honour the kill switch and a deny rule, as Claude Code's reads do. Grok fails open if it kills t…Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-ANENQIII.js:665 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesreturn { ...unknownMode(), kill: last.state.kill === true };Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/chunk-AIZYJJGD.js:83 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegesreturn `no: it ${STOPS_AT_LOGOUT}; run \`pushary daemon install\`, or \`sudo loginctl enable-linger $USER\``;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Privileged sudo commanddist/chunk-AIZYJJGD.js:76 · Privileged sudo command — agent may execute with elevated privilegestext: `Phone-start ${STOPS_AT_LOGOUT}. To keep it running: \`sudo loginctl enable-linger ${outcome.user}\``Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-G6HBBR6G.js:96 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateDecision = (input) => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-ANENQIII.js:2281 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processesif (mode?.kill || mode?.mode === "terminal_only") return;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Auto-update or dynamic fetch configurationdist/chunk-G6HBBR6G.js:105 · Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration — agent may load new code at runtimevar autoUpdateReportState = (decision) => {Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈77 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for pushary@1.9.219 as of 40 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

10 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim github actions: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Auto-update or dynamic fetch configuration≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  3. Destructive file system command detected≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  4. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  5. Privileged sudo command≈ +4 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
  6. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim github actionsPropose a patch to the maintainer