pushary@1.9.120
VERIFIED· not startedPublisher claims: "Human-in-the-loop (HITL) for AI agents: ask a person for approvals or answers by push notification. One command connects Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, Gemini CLI and more." Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.- Tested
- the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
PUSHARY_API_KEYor--with-tokenConfiguration, not credentials: CLAIM_PATH, CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR, CLIENT_REPORT_PATH, DEVICE_KEY_PATH, DISPLAY, EPISODE_PATH, GEMINI_CLI_HOME, GROK_SESSION_ID, MACHINES_PATH, OPENCODE_CONFIG_DIR, PLUGIN_LOCATIONS_KEY, PUSHARY_ADMISSION_FILE, PUSHARY_API_URL, PUSHARY_APP_REGISTER_TIMEOUT_MS, PUSHARY_BASE_URL, PUSHARY_BELL_QUIET, PUSHARY_BELL_UPGRADE_AT, PUSHARY_CLAUDE_BIN, PUSHARY_CONFIG_FILE, PUSHARY_DEFER_BYPASS, PUSHARY_LEDGER_FILE, PUSHARY_NO_BROWSER, PUSHARY_PIN_GLOBAL_VERSION, PUSHARY_RECIPIENT_PIN_FILE, PUSHARY_RESPECT_PERMISSION_MODE, PUSHARY_SESSION_KEY_DIR, PUSHARY_SUPPRESS_KEY_DRIFT_WARNING, PUSHARY_TRANSCRIPT_REGISTRY_DIR, PUSHARY_WRAPPER_ACTIVE, REUSED_KEY_SOURCE_LABELS, SELF_REVOKE_PATH, SPARED_KEY_WHY, SSH_TTY, START_PATH, WAYLAND_DISPLAY- Where it talks to
- pushary.com (its own)Also nodejs.org, apple.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- server startup · the tool list · tool behavior
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names nodejs.org, apple.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects PUSHARY_API_KEY only into requests to pushary.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-09 and scored it 81/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 2 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
appendAutoUpdateLog(context.logPath, `${new Date(context.now()).toISOString()} installing ${context.location.packageName}@${latest} into ${context.location.prefix}`);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.' [ -e "$left" ] && ! kill -0 "${left##*.}" 2>/dev/null && rm -f "$left"',Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.if (mode?.kill || mode?.mode === "terminal_only") return;Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.recordAutoUpdateCheck(context.statePath, pending, new Date(context.now()).toISOString());Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const previous = readAutoUpdateState(context.statePath);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.var skillsCliCommand = (agent, nodeVersion) => `npx -y skills@${skillsCliVersionForNode(nodeVersion)} add ${PUSHARY_SKILL_SOURCE}@${PUSHARY_SKILL_NAME} -y -g --agent ${agent}`;Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.…unsFromATemporaryFolder(entry)) say("This copy of Pushary runs from a temporary npx folder. If that folder is cleared, the cards stop reaching Pushary and Codex keeps work…Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.const state = recordAutoUpdateCheck(run.statePath ?? autoUpdateState(), { result: "failed", detail: claim.reason }, at);Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time."ask Add Pushary instructions to this project's CLAUDE.md/AGENTS.md? (default no)",Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.console.log(` ${dim("A browser on this computer is subscribed, but no phone is connected yet.")}`);Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for pushary@1.9.120 as of 5d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.