mcp@3.25.3

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Official 0xinsider CLI and MCP server: Polymarket analytics & infrastructure for sports and esports markets" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher 0xinsider · publishing for 231 daysInstalls 17,084Last detonated 1 h ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEY_ENV_VARAPI_KEY_PREFIXOXINSIDER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: NEUTRALIZED_META_KEY, OXINSIDER_API_URL, OXINSIDER_CONFIG_DIR
Where it talks to
0xinsider.com (its own)Also rfc-editor.org, nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names rfc-editor.org, nodejs.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY_ENV_VAR, API_KEY_PREFIX, OXINSIDER_API_KEY only into requests to 0xinsider.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets API_KEY_ENV_VAR=0xinsider.com,API_KEY_PREFIX=0xinsider.com,OXINSIDER_API_KEY=0xinsider.com -- npx -y @0xinsider/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.25.1

vet-skills diff mcp 3.25.1 3.25.3

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.25.1 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-21 and scored it 78/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Access to sensitive file paths; Access to sensitive file paths; HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agent. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 29 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
8.7sprocessdependency install exit 0
29sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-0VeLYb/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp/dist/tools/get-insider-radar.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
29sprocessscript backend runs setup only
29sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli-lib.js:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[mcp_servers."${SERVER_NAME}".env]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli-lib.js:416 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Replace the placeholder with your API key in the config file. Do not paste the key into a command or terminal output.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli-lib.js:61 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y ${PACKAGE_NAME}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli-lib.js:60 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y ${PACKAGE_NAME} initFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli-lib.js:422 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`[mcp_servers."${SERVER_NAME}".env]`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/product-cli/storage.js:41 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes* without removing it (kill -9, a crash, power loss). An abandoned lock is takenFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:528 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentThe `batch_get_traders`, `batch_get_market_flow` and `batch_get_market_intel` rows below are GENERATED: they publish the batch item cap, which is owned by `MAX_Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli-lib.js:421 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`[mcp_servers.${SERVER_NAME}.env]`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @0xinsider/mcp@3.25.3 as of 22 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

2 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim 0xinsider: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  2. Hidden instructions≈ +6 on the totalRemove HTML comments, zero-width characters and white-on-white text that carry instructions. Everything the agent is meant to read should be visible to the person reading the file.
  3. Access to sensitive file paths≈ +4 on the totalStop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
  4. File type combined with upload action≈ +2 on the totalRemove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Process kill command≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim 0xinsiderPropose a patch to the maintainer