mcp@3.25.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Official 0xinsider CLI and MCP server: Polymarket analytics & infrastructure for sports and esports markets" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher 0xinsider · publishing for 225 daysInstalls 18,892Last detonated 1 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @0xinsider/mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
API_KEY_ENV_VARAPI_KEY_PREFIXOXINSIDER_API_KEYConfiguration, not credentials: NEUTRALIZED_META_KEY, OXINSIDER_API_URL, OXINSIDER_CONFIG_DIR
Where it talks to
0xinsider.com (its own)Also rfc-editor.org, nodejs.org — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names rfc-editor.org, nodejs.org as well as its own vendor. The guard injects API_KEY_ENV_VAR, API_KEY_PREFIX, OXINSIDER_API_KEY only into requests to 0xinsider.com (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets API_KEY_ENV_VAR=0xinsider.com,API_KEY_PREFIX=0xinsider.com,OXINSIDER_API_KEY=0xinsider.com -- npx -y @0xinsider/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-15 and scored it 80/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 29 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
8.5sprocessdependency install exit 0
29sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-A8Ty0a/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp/dist/tools/get-insider-radar.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
29sprocessscript backend runs setup only
29sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli-lib.js:27 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files[mcp_servers."${SERVER_NAME}".env]Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli-lib.js:61 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y ${PACKAGE_NAME}Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/cli-lib.js:60 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codenpx -y ${PACKAGE_NAME} initFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli-lib.js:422 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`[mcp_servers."${SERVER_NAME}".env]`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actiondist/cli-lib.js:416 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesconsole.log("Replace the placeholder with your API key in the config file. Do not paste the key into a command or terminal output.");Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/cli-lib.js:421 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system files`[mcp_servers.${SERVER_NAME}.env]`,Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.md:480 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentThe `batch_get_traders`, `batch_get_market_flow` and `batch_get_market_intel` rows below are GENERATED: they publish the batch item cap, which is owned by `MAX_Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈61 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @0xinsider/mcp@3.25.0 as of 34 min ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.