mcp@2.219.0
VERIFIEDPublisher claims: "Agentistics MCP server — Claude Code analytics for Claude Desktop and Claude Code" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
VAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTHVAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_SPECIALConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTISTICS_API, AGENTISTICS_DIR, AGENTISTICS_MCP_NO_ORPHAN_GUARD, AGENTISTICS_NAY_SESSION, AGENTOP_MANAGED_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What we saw when it ran
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names claude.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects VAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTH, VAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_SPECIAL only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 2.217.5
vet-skills diff mcp 2.217.5 2.219.0This version reaches for something 2.217.5 did not: 1 new tool (agentistics_session_hold) · 1 rewritten tool descriptor (agentistics_session_role). Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
- New tools
- agentistics_session_hold
- Rewritten tool descriptors
- agentistics_session_role
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-20 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). It did what it claims and nothing else we could detect: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 26 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
erriding a live claim on purpose and an agent should not send it. {"type":"object","properties":{"ref":{"type":"string"},Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct."build": "bun build agentistics-mcp.ts --outfile dist/agentistics-mcp.js --external @modelcontextprotocol/sdk --target node && chmod +x dist/agentistics-mcp.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.