mcp@2.202.1
CAUTIONPublisher claims: "Agentistics MCP server — Claude Code analytics for Claude Desktop and Claude Code" Observed in sandbox: sends data to localhost.
Coverage
Server started and answered tools/list.- Tested
- MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
VAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTHVAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_SPECIALConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTISTICS_API, AGENTISTICS_DIR, AGENTISTICS_MCP_NO_ORPHAN_GUARD, AGENTISTICS_NAY_SESSION, AGENTOP_MANAGED_ID- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted localhost (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted localhost, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Tool description instructs the agent: instruction addressed to the agent. Summary: sends data to localhost.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
"build": "bun build agentistics-mcp.ts --outfile dist/agentistics-mcp.js --external @modelcontextprotocol/sdk --target node && chmod +x dist/agentistics-mcp.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.erriding a live claim on purpose and an agent should not send it. {"type":"object","properties":{"ref":{"type":"string"},Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @agentistics/mcp@2.202.1 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim agentistics: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.