mcp@2.202.1

CAUTION

Publisher claims: "Agentistics MCP server — Claude Code analytics for Claude Desktop and Claude Code" Observed in sandbox: sends data to localhost.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher agentistics · publishing for 203 daysInstalls 34,942Last detonated 6d ago

Coverage

Server started and answered tools/list.
Tested
MCP initialize and tools/list · every tool description, for hidden instructions · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
VAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_LENGTHVAULT_PASSWORD_MIN_SPECIALConfiguration, not credentials: AGENTISTICS_API, AGENTISTICS_DIR, AGENTISTICS_MCP_NO_ORPHAN_GUARD, AGENTISTICS_NAY_SESSION, AGENTOP_MANAGED_ID
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso claude.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · contacted localhost (undeclared)
What we could not test
what the tools do when called with real credentials

Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted localhost, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.

$vet-skills run --net localhost -- npx -y @agentistics/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios) on 2026-11-08 and scored it 71/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Tool description instructs the agent: instruction addressed to the agent. Summary: sends data to localhost.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 28 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
7.3sprocessdependency install exit 0
27snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:47291 · not in the allow-list, refused
27snetworkCONNECT tcp://localhost:47291 · not in the allow-list, refused
27sclaimed52 tools: agentistics_tasks, agentistics_task, agentistics_task_create, agentistics_task_status, agentistics_task_statuses, agentistics_task_types, agentistics_task_type_edit, agentistics_task_status_edit, agentistics_task_comment, agentistics_task_subtask, agentistics_task_link, agentistics_task_blocked_by, agentistics_task_next, agentistics_task_claim, agentistics_task_activity, agentistics_live_delivery, agentistics_task_edit, agentistics_task_session, agentistics_task_delete, agentistics_task_phase, agentistics_task_stage, agentistics_task_queue, agentistics_task_queue_answer, agentistics_session_groups, agentistics_session_group_create
27sprocessscript backend runs setup only
27sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:15 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "bun build agentistics-mcp.ts --outfile dist/agentistics-mcp.js --external @modelcontextprotocol/sdk --target node && chmod +x dist/agentistics-mcp.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
HIGH
Tool description instructs the agent: instruction addressed to the agentmcp:tools/agentistics_task_claim:1 · Instruction aimed at the agent: instruction addressed to the agenterriding a live claim on purpose and an agent should not send it. {"type":"object","properties":{"ref":{"type":"string"},Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈56 tok
1 file · 4 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈15,433 tok
52 tools · 297 per tool
Handshake
2878 ms
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 710

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @agentistics/mcp@2.202.1 as of 6d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

9 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim agentistics: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  3. File permission modification command≈ +2 on the totalRequest the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim agentisticsPropose a patch to the maintainer