mcp@1.50.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for the Browserless.io browser automation platform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher browserless.io · publishing for 171 daysInstalls 18,563Last detonated 10 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @browserless.io/mcp
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
install scripts, with decoy credentials in place · second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
AMPLITUDE_API_KEYBROWSERLESS_TOKENOAUTH_ADDITIONAL_REDIRECT_URI_PATTERNSOAUTH_ENABLEDOAUTH_REGISTER_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOURSUPABASE_OAUTH_CLIENT_IDSUPABASE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRETConfiguration, not credentials: ANALYTICS_ENABLED, BROWSERLESS_API_SERVER, BROWSERLESS_API_URL, BROWSERLESS_CACHE_TTL, BROWSERLESS_MAX_RETRIES, BROWSERLESS_PUBLIC_URL, BROWSERLESS_TIMEOUT, BROWSERLESS_UPLOAD_DIRS, MCP_ALLOWED_API_URL_HOSTS, MCP_BASE_URL, MCP_COMPLIANCE_MODE, MCP_IDLE_TTL_MS, MCP_INTERNAL_PORT, MCP_SWEEP_MS, OTEL_ENABLED, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_ENDPOINT, OTEL_EXPORTER_OTLP_LOGS_ENDPOINT, OTEL_METRIC_EXPORT_INTERVAL, OTEL_SDK_DISABLED, OTEL_SERVICE_NAME, REDIS_URL, SQS_QUEUE_URL, SQS_REGION, SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY, SUPABASE_URL, TRANSPORT
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso browserless.io, vscode.dev, claude.ai, chatgpt.com, grok.com, cursor.com, devin.ai, itsdev.in, make.com, celonis.com, gymshark.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names browserless.io, vscode.dev, claude.ai, chatgpt.com, grok.com, cursor.com, devin.ai, itsdev.in, make.com, celonis.com, gymshark.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects AMPLITUDE_API_KEY, BROWSERLESS_TOKEN, OAUTH_ADDITIONAL_REDIRECT_URI_PATTERNS, OAUTH_ENABLED, OAUTH_REGISTER_RATE_LIMIT_PER_HOUR, SUPABASE_OAUTH_CLIENT_ID, SUPABASE_OAUTH_CLIENT_SECRET only into requests to the host you bind (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --net declared -- npx -y @browserless.io/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.48.0

vet-skills diff mcp 1.48.0 1.50.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.48.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-19 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 44 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessinstall script run in the sandbox
23sprocessdependency install exit 0
43sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-AzUiY1/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp/build/src/skills/system-prompt.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
43sprocessscript backend runs setup only
43sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset

Static findings

MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/src/tools/agent.js:714 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesctx.log.warn('Inline media unavailable; preserving original capture output.');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsbuild/src/lib/agent-client.js:156 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking.describe('Bring-your-own upstream, e.g. http://user:pass@host:port'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07
HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationbuild/src/lib/agent-client.js:458 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials// logged on eviction and the URL may carry user:pass credentials. HashingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @browserless.io/mcp@1.50.0 as of 10 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.