mcp@1.46.0

VERIFIED· not started

Publisher claims: "MCP (Model Context Protocol) server for the Browserless.io browser automation platform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher browserless.io · publishing for 171 daysInstalls 18,563Last detonated 12d ago
$claude mcp add mcp -- npx -y @browserless.io/mcp
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Coverage

Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed.
Tested
second launch with the clock 45 days ahead · the dependency install step · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What we saw when it ran
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
server startup · the tool list · tool behavior

Not enough was observed to say yet. Not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 1.45.0

vet-skills diff mcp 1.45.0 1.46.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.45.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

1.45.0 was not run in the sandbox (install failed); the comparison covers what static analysis recorded only.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (3 scenarios; not started: dependency install failed; the server itself was not observed) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 84/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 1 s · 3 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.9sprocessdependency install exit 1
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
1.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
1.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
1.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
1.1sprocesssecond launch, clock +45 days, CI unset
1.2sprocessexec /usr/bin/faketime

Static findings

HIGH
Credential pass-through configurationbuild/src/lib/agent-client.js:439 · Credential pass-through configuration — agent relays sensitive credentials// logged on eviction and the URL may carry user:pass credentials. HashingFix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST02
MEDIUM
File type combined with upload actionbuild/src/tools/agent.js:645 · File type combined with upload action — agent may exfiltrate local data filesctx.log.warn('Inline media unavailable; preserving original capture output.');Fix: Remove the call, or declare the host in frontmatter and explain in the README what is sent and why.
AST07
HIGH
URL with embedded credentialsbuild/src/lib/agent-client.js:154 · URL with embedded credentials — may be phishing or credential leaking.describe('Bring-your-own upstream, e.g. http://user:pass@host:port'),Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST07

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈57 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @browserless.io/mcp@1.46.0 as of 12d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.