mcp@1.39.6
CAUTION· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Zero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface — fetches the matching red binary and spawns `red mcp` over stdio." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
- no credential variables read in the code
- Where it talks to
- no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com (undeclared)
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
What changed since 1.37.0
vet-skills diff mcp 1.37.0 1.39.6In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 1.37.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.
The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 54/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL; Pipe-to-shell pattern. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenariosStatic findings
Zero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface — fetches the matching red binary and spawns `red mcp` over stdio.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* @reddb-io/mcp — zero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* `npx -y @reddb-io/mcp` always pulls the latest published launcher, thisFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* 2. `<package>/bin/red[.exe]` if already present (e.g. a previous npx runFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* npx -y @reddb-io/mcp [args…]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.* argv passed to `npx @reddb-io/mcp ...` is forwarded after `mcp` (e.g.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.` curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo}/main/install.sh | bash\n` +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.` curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo}/main/install.sh | bash\n` +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.` curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo}/main/install.sh | bash\n` +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out."description": "Zero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface — fetches the matching red binary and spawns `red mcp` over stdio.",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @reddb-io/mcp@1.39.6 as of 8 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.
What would make this Verified
26 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%- Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
- Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
- Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim reddb-io: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
- Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
- Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.