mcp@1.33.0

CAUTION· startup only

Publisher claims: "Zero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface — fetches the matching red binary and spawns `red mcp` over stdio." Observed in sandbox: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher reddb-io · publishing for 139 daysInstalls 15,963Last detonated 3d ago

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Caution here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
no credential variables read in the code
Where it talks to
no vendor host named in the codeAlso githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com (undeclared)
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Find out what these hosts are first. In the honeypot it contacted release-assets.githubusercontent.com, which nothing in the package names as its own. If that is the vendor's service, fine; if you cannot place it, do not connect it.

$vet-skills run --net release-assets.githubusercontent.com -- npx -y @reddb-io/mcp

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-11 and scored it 54/100 (Caution). It is not known to be malicious, but it has behaviour or code a security policy should decide on before install. Notable findings: Pipe-to-shell pattern; Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL. Summary: sends data to release-assets.githubusercontent.com.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20snetworkCONNECT tcp://github.com:443
20snetworkCONNECT tcp://release-assets.githubusercontent.com:443 · not in the allow-list, refused
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/reddb-io/reddb/main/install.sh | bash export REDDB_BIN="$(command -v red)" - Download a release binary manually from https://github.com/reddb-io/reddb/releases
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

CRITICAL
Pipe-to-shell patternsrc/launcher.js:43 · Pipe-to-shell pattern — downloads and immediately executes remote code` curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo}/main/install.sh | bash\n` +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/launcher.js:5 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* npx -y @reddb-io/mcp [args…]Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/spawn.js:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* argv passed to `npx @reddb-io/mcp ...` is forwarded after `mcp` (e.g.Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST06
HIGH
Direct script execution from GitHub raw URLsrc/launcher.js:43 · Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL — unverified code source` curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo}/main/install.sh | bash\n` +Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packageSKILL.md:6 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted codeZero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface — fetches the matching red binary and spawns `red mcp` over stdio.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/binary.js:7 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* 2. `<package>/bin/red[.exe]` if already present (e.g. a previous npx runFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
Remote installer piped to shellsrc/launcher.js:43 · Remote installer piped to shell` curl -fsSL https://raw.githubusercontent.com/${repo}/main/install.sh | bash\n` +Fix: Build commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
AST07
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagepackage.json:4 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code"description": "Zero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface — fetches the matching red binary and spawns `red mcp` over stdio.",Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/launcher.js:3 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* @reddb-io/mcp — zero-install npx launcher for the RedDB MCP surface.Fix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagesrc/binary.js:15 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* `npx -y @reddb-io/mcp` always pulls the latest published launcher, thisFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈64 tok
1 file · 12 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @reddb-io/mcp@1.33.0 as of 3d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.

What would make this Verified

26 points to 80 · weights: behavior 45%, static 25%, prompt 15%, publisher 15%
  1. Contacts a host you did not declare≈ +23 on the totalList every host you talk to in SKILL.md frontmatter (`network: [api.example.com]`), or stop contacting the ones you cannot justify.
  2. Pipe-to-shell pattern≈ +9 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
  3. Unclaimed publisher≈ +8 on the totalClaim reddb-io: a verified publisher gets +50 on publisher trust. It is free and usually instant with GitHub sign-in.
  4. Direct script execution from GitHub raw URL≈ +4 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  5. npx invocation of non-well-known package≈ +2 on the totalPin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
  6. Remote installer piped to shell≈ +2 on the totalBuild commands from fixed arguments, never from interpolated strings; prefer an API client over shelling out.
Publish a new version to npm, then queue it here. Not your skill? Claim the handle to get verdict changes by email.Claim reddb-ioPropose a patch to the maintainer