Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@5.7.1

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for building and managing Clipform video forms" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher clipform · publishing for 248 daysInstalls 8,375Last detonated 26 h ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @clipform/mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
CLIPFORM_API_KEYRECALL_TOKEN_SOURCEConfiguration, not credentials: API_URL, CLAUDE_CODE, CLIPFORM_TELEMETRY, CURSOR_SESSION_ID, DO_NOT_TRACK, MCP_INSTRUCTIONS_KEY, NEXT_PUBLIC_API_URL, NEXT_PUBLIC_DASHBOARD_URL, NEXT_PUBLIC_DOCS_URL, NEXT_PUBLIC_MARKETING_URL, NEXT_PUBLIC_VIEWER_URL, VARIABLE_KEY_MAX_LENGTH
Where it talks to
clipform.io (its own)Also smith-forge.com, posthog.com, sentry.io — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names smith-forge.com, posthog.com, sentry.io as well as its own vendor. The guard injects CLIPFORM_API_KEY, RECALL_TOKEN_SOURCE only into requests to clipform.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets CLIPFORM_API_KEY=clipform.io,RECALL_TOKEN_SOURCE=clipform.io -- npx -y @clipform/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 20 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
20sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-yDgbhV/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp-server/dist/chunk-7F36T6AQ.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
20sprocessscript backend runs setup only
20sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/instrument.js:5038 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvar STARTUP_NODE_OPTIONS = globalThis.process?.env?.NODE_OPTIONS;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.template.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGENERATED FILE SOURCE TEMPLATE. README.md is generated from this template by scripts/sync-mcp-server-readme.mjs. Edit prose HERE, never in README.md. URLs/packaFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.template.md:22 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `{{MCP_URL}}` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.md:16 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `https://mcp.clipform.io` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-D65NJDP5.js:808 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// (kill switch: set enabled:false + status:'beta' - 'live' with enabled:false throwsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.template.md:22 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `{{MCP_URL}}` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:16 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `https://mcp.clipform.io` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.template.md:22 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `{{MCP_URL}}` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/server.d.ts:62 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* to register every toolset (today's behavior - stdio/npx and everyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:16 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `https://mcp.clipform.io` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 28 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @clipform/mcp-server@5.7.1 as of 26 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.