Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@4.11.4

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "MCP server for building and managing Clipform video forms" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher clipform · publishing for 248 daysInstalls 8,375Last detonated 7d ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @clipform/mcp-server
WatchReport an issue

Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

Code inventory arrives with this version's next honeypot run.
It will ask for
unknown until the next run
Where it talks to
unknown until the next run
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Not enough was observed to say yet. Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested. This version's code has not been inventoried for credentials and hosts either; both arrive with its next honeypot run (popular servers first). `vet-skills try mcp-server` runs it now and prints the full answer.

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-07 and scored it 82/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 0 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/date
0.1sprocessexec /usr/bin/timeout
0.1sclaimedno tools/list reply (exit 0)
0.1sprocessscript backend runs setup only
0.1sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
Process kill commanddist/chunk-BUSXPGIE.js:749 · Process kill command — agent can terminate processes// (kill switch: set enabled:false + status:'beta' - 'live' with enabled:false throwsFix: Build commands from fixed arguments; do not interpolate untrusted strings into a shell.
AST05
HIGH
Access to sensitive file pathsdist/instrument.js:5038 · Access to sensitive file paths — SSH keys, AWS credentials, env files, or system filesvar STARTUP_NODE_OPTIONS = globalThis.process?.env?.NODE_OPTIONS;Fix: Stop enumerating or reading credential locations; take secrets from a declared environment variable the user sets on purpose.
AST05
CRITICAL
HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentREADME.template.md:1 · HTML comment carrying imperative instructions to the agentGENERATED FILE SOURCE TEMPLATE. README.md is generated from this template by scripts/sync-mcp-server-readme.mjs. Edit prose HERE, never in README.md. URLs/packaFix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.md:16 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `https://mcp.clipform.io` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.template.md:22 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `{{MCP_URL}}` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
MEDIUM
npx invocation of non-well-known packagedist/server.d.ts:62 · npx invocation of non-well-known package — may execute untrusted code* to register every toolset (today's behavior - stdio/npx and everyFix: Pin versions and sources; vendor anything fetched at install time.
AST06
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.template.md:22 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `{{MCP_URL}}` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01
LOW
Authorization escalation languageREADME.md:16 · Authorization escalation language · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `https://mcp.clipform.io` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Context shift attemptREADME.template.md:22 · Context shift attempt — trying to change operational mode · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `{{MCP_URL}}` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01
LOW
Prompt injectionREADME.md:16 · Prompt injection — known jailbreak technique reference · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file · informational: not an instruction file**ChatGPT:** Settings → Connectors → Advanced → enable Developer Mode → Create connector → enter `https://mcp.clipform.io` (requires Pro/Team/Enterprise)Fix: Keep SKILL.md to visible, descriptive text. Remove comments and encoded text that address the agent.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈52 tok
1 file · 28 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

No advisories in OSV for @clipform/mcp-server@4.11.4 as of 7d ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.