Skills/npm/mcp-server

mcp-server@3.2.0

VERIFIED· startup only

Publisher claims: "Official MCP server for Qase Test Management Platform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Registry npm (MCP server)Publisher qase · publishing for 385 daysInstalls 37,713Last detonated 29 min ago
$claude mcp add mcp-server -- npx -y @qase/mcp-server
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Coverage

Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.
Tested
server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
Not tested
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.

Before you give it your token

It will ask for
QASE_API_TOKENQASE_OAUTH_AUDIENCEQASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_URLQASE_OAUTH_ENABLEDQASE_OAUTH_ISSUERQASE_OAUTH_JWKS_URLQASE_OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHMSQASE_OAUTH_PUBLIC_URLQASE_OAUTH_REGISTRATION_URLQASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URLQASE_OAUTH_REVOCATION_URLQASE_OAUTH_TOKEN_URLConfiguration, not credentials: QASE_API_DOMAIN, QASE_API_PROTOCOL, QASE_MCP_REDIS_URL, QASE_MCP_SOURCE
Where it talks to
qase.io, qase.lo (its own)Also evil.example, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
What the honeypot saw
no credential files read · no network
What we could not test
the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials

Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names evil.example, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects QASE_API_TOKEN, QASE_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, QASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_URL, QASE_OAUTH_ENABLED, QASE_OAUTH_ISSUER, QASE_OAUTH_JWKS_URL, QASE_OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHMS, QASE_OAUTH_PUBLIC_URL, QASE_OAUTH_REGISTRATION_URL, QASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URL, QASE_OAUTH_REVOCATION_URL, QASE_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL only into requests to qase.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.

$vet-skills run --secrets QASE_API_TOKEN=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_AUDIENCE=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_URL=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_ENABLED=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_ISSUER=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_JWKS_URL=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHMS=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_PUBLIC_URL=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_REGISTRATION_URL=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URL=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_REVOCATION_URL=qase.io,QASE_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL=qase.io -- npx -y @qase/mcp-server

Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.

What changed since 3.1.0

vet-skills diff mcp-server 3.1.0 3.2.0

In the sandbox, this version reached for nothing 3.1.0 did not. Compared from the two recorded runs, not from source.

The guard can hold an update like this until someone approves it (runtime.on_change: hold). A change that only shows with a real credential, or on a path the run did not reach, is not in a trace and so not in this comparison.

Is [email protected] safe to install?

KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-18 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.

Behavior trace

Honeypot run · 42 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviations
t+CategoryObserved action
0.0sprocessno install scripts in bundle
22sprocessdependency install exit 0
42sclaimedstartup only: exited (0) before answering · code: 'ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND', url: 'file:///tmp/ks-detonate-QMiOCN/task/home/work/acme-api/.claude/skills/mcp-server/build/transports/streamableHttp.js' } Node.js v22.23.5
42sprocessscript backend runs setup only
42sprocessno install scripts to re-run

Static findings

MEDIUM
File permission modification commandpackage.json:48 · File permission modification command — agent changes file ownership/permissions"build": "tsc && chmod +x build/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.
AST05
LOW
Refusal suppressiondocs/migration.md:46 · Refusal suppression — attempting to prevent safety responses · informational: not an instruction file…bout a prompt nobody was ever shown sent testers looking for deletions they had never refused. #### What a 2025-era client loses over HTTP This is the one genuine regress…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.
AST01

Cost to the agent

Instructions loaded
≈50 tok
1 file · 81 in bundle
Tool list per prompt
≈0 tok
0 tools · 0 per tool
Handshake
no reply
launch to tools/list, stdio
Undocumented tools
0
description under 20 chars · avg 0

Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.

Known vulnerabilities

Not checked against OSV yet; the weekly check has not reached this version.