mcp-server@3.0.7
VERIFIED· startup onlyPublisher claims: "Official MCP server for Qase Test Management Platform" Observed in sandbox: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Coverage
Startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested.- Tested
- server startup over stdio (initialize sent) · every file read, file written and host contacted by what ran
- Not tested
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
What this means for the label: Verified here covers what ran. The server's tools were not exercised with a real credential, so nothing about their behavior is asserted; the credential summary below says what to do with that.
Before you give it your token
- It will ask for
QASE_API_TOKENQASE_OAUTH_AUDIENCEQASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_URLQASE_OAUTH_ENABLEDQASE_OAUTH_ISSUERQASE_OAUTH_JWKS_URLQASE_OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHMSQASE_OAUTH_PUBLIC_URLQASE_OAUTH_REGISTRATION_URLQASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URLQASE_OAUTH_REVOCATION_URLQASE_OAUTH_TOKEN_URLConfiguration, not credentials: QASE_API_DOMAIN, QASE_API_PROTOCOL, QASE_MCP_REDIS_URL, QASE_MCP_SOURCE- Where it talks to
- qase.io, qase.lo (its own)Also evil.example, githubusercontent.com — not the publisher's domain; check what for before connecting.
- What the honeypot saw
- no credential files read · no network
- What we could not test
- the tool list (the server exited before answering) · what the tools do when called with real credentials
Connect it with a scoped credential, under the guard, and read the third-party hosts first. The code names evil.example, githubusercontent.com as well as its own vendor. The guard injects QASE_API_TOKEN, QASE_OAUTH_AUDIENCE, QASE_OAUTH_AUTHORIZATION_URL, QASE_OAUTH_ENABLED, QASE_OAUTH_ISSUER, QASE_OAUTH_JWKS_URL, QASE_OAUTH_JWT_ALGORITHMS, QASE_OAUTH_PUBLIC_URL, QASE_OAUTH_REGISTRATION_URL, QASE_OAUTH_RESOURCE_URL, QASE_OAUTH_REVOCATION_URL, QASE_OAUTH_TOKEN_URL only into requests to qase.io (and its subdomains) and refuses the rest.
Never paste a credential into a chat, a ticket or a report, including ours. How the guard holds it.
Is [email protected] safe to install?
KillerSkills ran it in the KillerSkills honeypot sandbox (2 scenarios; startup only; authenticated tool behavior not tested) on 2026-11-13 and scored it 93/100 (Verified). In what ran, nothing we could detect went wrong: no undeclared network egress, no credential reads, no persistent instruction writes. What it does with a real credential was not observed; the static findings and the publisher carry the rest of the score. Summary: no network, touches nothing outside the project, writes no memory.
Behavior trace
Honeypot run · 44 s · 2 scenarios · 0 deviationsStatic findings
"build": "tsc && chmod +x build/index.js",Fix: Request the narrowest permission that works; replace wildcards with the exact paths or hosts.…bout a prompt nobody was ever shown sent testers looking for deletions they had never refused. #### What a 2025-era client loses over HTTP This is the one genuine regress…Fix: Remove the text that addresses the agent rather than the reader; describe behavior, do not instruct.Cost to the agent
Tokens estimated at four characters each. The tool list is re-read by the agent on every turn, so it is the number to compare between servers that do the same job: ranked across the index.
Known vulnerabilities
No advisories in OSV for @qase/mcp-server@3.0.7 as of 24 h ago. This is the package itself, not its dependencies.